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Furtive Encryption: Power, Trust, and the 
Constitutional Cost of Collective Surveillance 
JEFFREY L. VAGLE* 
Recent revelations of heretofore secret U.S. government surveillance programs 
have sparked national conversations about their constitutionality and the delicate 
balance between security and civil liberties in a constitutional democracy. Among 
the revealed policies asserted by the National Security Agency (NSA) is a provision 
found in the “minimization procedures” required under section 702 of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. This provision allows the NSA to collect and 
keep indefinitely any encrypted information collected from domestic 
communications—including the communications of U.S. citizens. That is, according 
to the U.S. government, the mere fact that a U.S. citizen has encrypted her 
electronic communications is enough to give the NSA the right to store that data 
until it is able to decrypt or decode it. 
Through this provision, the NSA is automatically treating all electronic 
communications from U.S. citizens that are hidden or obscured through 
encryption—for whatever reason—as suspicious, a direct descendant of the 
“nothing-to-hide” family of privacy minimization arguments. The ubiquity of 
electronic communication in the United States and elsewhere has led to the 
widespread use of encryption, the vast majority of it for innocuous purposes. This 
Article argues that the mere encryption by individuals of their electronic 
communications is not alone a basis for individualized suspicion. Moreover, this 
Article asserts that the NSA’s policy amounts to a suspicionless search and seizure. 
This program is therefore in direct conflict with the fundamental principles 
underlying the Fourth Amendment, specifically the protection of individuals from 
unwarranted government power and the establishment of the reciprocal trust 
between citizen and government that is necessary for a healthy democracy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In June 2013, a twenty-nine-year-old former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
systems administrator and NSA private contractor named Edward Snowden 
publicly disclosed that he was the source of top-secret documents disclosed to 
journalists regarding multiple secret surveillance programs within the NSA and 
other agencies.1 The subsequent publication of some of these leaked government 
documents has triggered a firestorm of discussion—often overheated—on topics 
ranging from the nature of (and need for) government secrecy;2 the adequacy of 
background checks for government employees and contractors;3 Mr. Snowden’s 
girlfriend;4 Mr. Snowden’s status as hero or traitor;5 the plight of whistleblowers;6 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. See Barton Gellman, Aaron Blake & Greg Miller, Man Who Leaked NSA Secrets Steps 
Forward, WASH. POST, Jun. 10, 2013, at A01; Glenn Greenwald, Ewan MacAskill & Laura 
Poitras, Edward Snowden: The Man Responsible for the Leaks of Secret Documents Detailing 
the NSA’s Widespread Phone and Internet Surveillance, GUARDIAN, June 10, 2013, at 2; Mark 
Mazzetti & Michael S. Schmidt, Ex-C.I.A. Worker Says He Disclosed U.S. Surveillance, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 10, 2013, at A1; M.G., Surveillance in America: Over to the Dark Side, 
ECONOMIST (June 10, 2013), http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2013/06
/surveillance-america-0. 
 2. See, e.g., Mark Bowden, What Snowden and Manning Don’t Understand About 
Secrecy, ATLANTIC (Aug. 23, 2013, 7:00 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive
/2013/08/bowden-manning-snowden/278973/. 
 3. See, e.g., Brent Kendall & Dion Nissenbaum, Leaker’s Security Check Faulted, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2013, at A1. 
 4. See, e.g., Joe Coscarelli, Edward Snowden’s Girlfriend Is a Pole-Dancing Acrobat 
with a Dramatic Blog, N.Y. MAG. (June 11, 2013, 9:14 AM), http://nymag.com/daily
/intelligencer/2013/06/edward-snowden-girlfriend-lindsay-mills-blog.html. 
 5. See, e.g., Dana Milbank, Editorial, Exposing the Zealous National Security State, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 22, 2013, at A02.; Jeffrey Toobin, Edward Snowden’s Real Impact, NEW YORKER 
(Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/edward-snowdens-real-impact. 
 6. See, e.g., Colman McCarthy, Whistleblowers Shine Necessary Light on US Shadows, 
NAT’L CATH. REP., Aug. 30, 2013, at 24; Dana Milbank, Editorial, The Price of 
Whistleblowing, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2013, at A17; Adam Waytz, James Dungan & Liane 
Young, The Whistle-Blower’s Quandry, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2013, at 12 SR; Eyal Press, 
Whistleblower, Leaker, Traitor, Spy, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Aug. 5, 2013, 2:17 PM), 
http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2013/aug/05/whistleblower-leaker-traitor-spy/. 
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and, finally, the legality, necessity, and wisdom of the secret surveillance of U.S. 
citizens.7 
Hidden among the more dramatic revelations like PRISM8 and XKeyscore9 was 
a document approved by U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder that articulated 
“minimization procedures” required of the NSA under section 702 of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA).10 One of the provisions listed in this 
                                                                                                                 
 
 7. The debate over government surveillance of its citizens has created some odd 
bedfellows, with libertarian conservatives and (liberal) civil libertarians joining to oppose 
neoconservatives, neoliberals, and supporters of the Obama administration. See, e.g., Philip 
Giraldi, Edward Snowden Is No Traitor, AM. CONSERVATIVE (July 16, 2013), 
http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/edward-snowden-is-no-traitor/; Michael 
Hayden, Ex-CIA Chief: What Edward Snowden Did, CNN (July 19, 2013, 11:31 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/19/opinion/hayden-snowden-impact; Seth Mandel, Of Course 
America Spies on the UN, COMMENT. MAG. (Aug. 27, 2013, 1:30 PM), 
http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2013/08/27/of-course-america-spies-on-the-un/; 
Karen McVeigh, NSA Surveillance Program Violates the Constitution, ACLU Says, 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 27, 2013, 3:31 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/27/nsa
-surveillance-program-illegal-aclu-lawsuit; Susan Milligan, Snowden: Both a Hero and a 
Traitor?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Aug. 1, 2013, 9:35 AM), http://www.usnews.com
/opinion/blogs/susan-milligan/2013/08/01/edward-snowden-leaves-russias-moscow-airport
-both-a-hero-and-a-traitor; Pierre Thomas, Mike Levine, Jack Date, Luis Martinez & Jack 
Cloherty, Officials: How Edward Snowden Could Hurt the U.S., ABC NEWS (June 24, 2013, 
6:38 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2013/06/officials-how-edward-snowden
-could-hurt-the-u-s/. 
 8. PRISM is the name of a formerly secret NSA mass-surveillance program that gathers 
data by “tapping directly into the central servers of nine leading U.S. Internet companies, 
extracting audio and video chats, photographs, e-mails, documents, and connection logs that 
enable analysts to track foreign targets.” Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S. Mines Internet 
Firms’ Data, Documents Show, WASH. POST, June 7, 2013, at A01. 
 9. XKeyscore is the name of a formerly clandestine NSA system used for searching 
and analyzing the vast quantities of data collected from individuals across the globe. See, 
e.g., Sean Gallagher, NSA’s Internet Taps Can Find Systems To Hack, Track VPNs and 
Word Docs, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 1, 2013, 5:30 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech
-policy/2013/08/nsas-internet-taps-can-find-systems-to-hack-track-vpns-and-word-docs/. 
 10. NSA, EXHIBIT B: MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES USED BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
AGENCY IN CONNECTION WITH ACQUISITIONS OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION 
(2007), available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/20/exhibit-b
-nsa-procedures-document [hereinafter MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES EXHIBIT B]. Section 702 
of FISA articulates certain procedures and limitations that the Attorney General and the 
Director of National Intelligence may jointly authorize on “the targeting of persons 
reasonably believed to be located outside the United States to acquire foreign intelligence 
information.” 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a) (2012). Among these limitations, which require that any 
surveillance “shall be conducted in a manner consistent with the fourth amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States,” is the provision that the targeting of surveillance subjects 
be subject to “minimization procedures” designed to “ensure that an acquisition authorized 
under subsection (a) is limited to targeting persons reasonably believed to be located outside 
the United States,” and to “prevent the intentional acquisition of any communication as to 
which the sender and all intended recipients are known at the time of the acquisition to be 
located in the United States.” § 1881a(b)–(e). Compliance with these FISA requirements is 
subject to review by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. § 1881a(i)(1)(A). 
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document applied specifically to encrypted information and allowed the NSA to 
collect and keep indefinitely any information obtained from “domestic 
communications”—which includes the communications of U.S. citizens—for 
“cryptanalytic, traffic analytic or signal exploitation purposes.”11 In other words, 
under these minimization procedures, the mere fact that data is encrypted is alone 
enough to give the NSA the right to store that data (regardless of its U.S. or foreign 
origin) and hold it for as long as it takes to decrypt it.12 
The implications that flow from this policy are stunning. The NSA is 
automatically treating all electronic communications from U.S. citizens that are 
hidden or obscured through encryption—for whatever reason—as suspicious, a 
direct descendant of the “nothing-to-hide” family of privacy minimization 
arguments. Common arguments made in the defense of government surveillance 
typically follow one of two closely related themes: “If you have nothing to hide, 
you have nothing to fear” (the government’s perspective), or “I have nothing to 
hide, so I have no objection to government surveillance.” These “nothing-to-hide” 
arguments and their ilk can be superficially compelling and have been made for 
some time.13 But don’t we all have something to hide? After all, as Lavrenti Beria, 
head of Joseph Stalin’s secret police, supposedly said, “Show me the man, and I’ll 
find you the crime.”14 This is a rather weak response, however, especially against a 
“nothing-to-hide” argument based on minimal, nonpublic intrusions of privacy 
interests. Scholars and commentators have addressed the “nothing-to-hide” 
argument in more depth.15 
Putting aside the fact that the NSA had been less than truthful—both to the 
public as well as to other branches of government—about the existence and nature 
of such broad and legally questionable surveillance programs,16 this sort of blanket 
                                                                                                                 
 
 11. MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES EXHIBIT B, supra note 10, at 2. 
 12. “In the context of cryptanalytic effort, maintenance of technical data bases requires 
retention of all communications that are enciphered or reasonably believed to contain secret 
meaning, and sufficient duration may consist of any period of time during which encrypted 
material is subject to, or of use in, cryptanalysis.” Id. at 5. 
 13. See, e.g., HENRY JAMES, THE REVERBERATOR 183 (Grove Press, Inc. 1979) (1888) 
(“[I]f these people had done bad things they ought to be ashamed of themselves and he 
couldn’t pity them, and if they hadn’t done them there was no need of making such a rumpus 
about other people knowing.”). 
 14. Roger Cohen, The Real Threat to America, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/26/opinion/26iht-edcohen.html. 
 15. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN 
PRIVACY AND SECURITY (2011); Jennifer Granick, Surveillance Myth #1: I Have Nothing To 
Hide, STAN. L. SCH. CENTER FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (June 24, 2013, 12:58 PM), 
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2013/06/surveillance-myth-1-i-have-nothing-hide; Bruce 
Schneier, The Eternal Value of Privacy, WIRED (May 18, 2006), http://www.wired.com
/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2006/05/70886. I will explore this issue in 
more detail in Part II, infra. 
 16. In March 2013, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper testified before 
Congress and was asked whether the NSA collected any type of data on U.S. citizens. He 
responded, “No sir.” Once the documents revealed by Edward Snowden in June 2013 made 
it clear that this denial was simply not true, Mr. Clapper told NBC that his answer had been 
the “least untruthful” answer possible. Tabassum Zakaria, U.S. Spy Agency Edges into the 
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suspicion by a government of its citizens goes far beyond the “individualized 
suspicion of wrongdoing” generally required by the Fourth Amendment for a 
reasonable search.17 Exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement 
have been established in the past few decades to permit searches under specified 
conditions: the government may have “special needs” beyond the scope of normal 
law enforcement,18 or the government may have a foreign intelligence surveillance 
exemption.19 In this Article, I argue that neither limited exception applies here. 
Furthermore, generalized domestic government surveillance programs have been 
anathema to Americans from the earliest days of the nation,20 and the use of 
technological methods to achieve what the Framers would have found abhorrent21 is 
feeding an accelerating erosion of trust between the U.S. government and its people. 
This Article is an effort to demonstrate how collective surveillance without a 
basis of suspicion not only violates the Fourth Amendment but does so in a way 
that corrupts two principal constitutional tenets—protection of individuals from 
undue governmental power and the mutual trust between government and citizen 
that must exist in a healthy democratic society.22 Current Fourth Amendment 
                                                                                                                 
Light After Snowden Revelations, REUTERS, Aug. 25, 2013, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/25/us-usa-security-nsa-idUSBRE97O08120130825; 
see also Ruth Marcus, Editorial, More NSA Deceptions, WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 2013, at A19; 
John Fund, Time for Answers from the NSA, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Aug. 19, 2013, 4:00 AM), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/356098/time-answers-nsa-john-fund. 
 17. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) (citing Chandler v. Miller, 
520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997)). 
 18. The “special needs” doctrine has been applied in certain limited circumstances to 
uphold suspicionless searches where the government program was designed to serve “special 
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement.” Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 
U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)) (applying 
doctrine to random drug testing of student athletes); see also Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. 
Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665–66 (1989) (applying doctrine to drug tests for United States 
Customs Service employees seeking transfer or promotion to certain positions); Skinner v. Ry. 
Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619–20 (1989) (applying doctrine to drug and alcohol tests 
for railway employees involved in train accidents or found to be in violation of particular safety 
regulations). I will examine the applicability of this doctrine to the NSA’s policy of 
suspicionless collection and indefinite storage of all domestic encrypted data in Part II, infra. 
 19. I will more fully discuss FISA, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1871 (2012), and related Fourth 
Amendment exceptions under “national security” conditions, in Part II.E, infra. I will note 
here that the Supreme Court has held that a domestic surveillance exception to the Fourth 
Amendment does not exist, even when the surveillance is under the umbrella of national 
security. See United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297 (1972). 
 20. “The makers of our Constitution . . . conferred, as against the Government, the right 
to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized 
men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy 
of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.” Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting), overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 21. See Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. at 655 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (expressing 
opinion that “the Framers would be appalled by the vision of mass governmental intrusions”). 
 22. In this Article, I distinguish collective or pervasive surveillance of the kind revealed 
in the Snowden documents, which show implementation and execution of such surveillance 
without benefit of law, from targeted surveillance of individuals, which requires court 
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doctrine has, unfortunately, largely ignored these principles in favor of a balancing 
test between the needs of the government and an individual’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy.23 While privacy indeed emerges from these principles, 
advances in surveillance-enabling technologies are rapidly making privacy a poor 
proxy for protection from government power and the enhancement of mutual 
societal trust. The Supreme Court’s shift to a factual analysis and quantification of 
privacy has drawn attention away from the consideration of fundamental 
constitutional values and has led to some rather bizarre, fact-specific arguments. 
I argue that our current Fourth Amendment theories of privacy have become a 
sort of Maginot Line: a once-powerful deterrent made gradually irrelevant by 
technological advances, one that has therefore become unable to protect individuals 
from a government with the technological capability and desire to collect and store 
for future reading that which we have clearly designated as private—our encrypted 
data. Faced with this reality, we must adjust Fourth Amendment doctrine to protect 
the underlying constitutional principles at stake. 
I begin in Part I with a necessary, but brief, introduction to encryption, its uses, 
and why it provides an important bulwark against unreasonable government 
intrusions. Part II examines the amorphous concepts of security, secrecy, and 
privacy, as well as the mistaken presumption by courts of privacy’s factual and 
quantifiable nature. This Part additionally provides a historical analysis of Fourth 
Amendment doctrine and its tense relationship with technology. I also examine the 
historical underpinnings of current Fourth Amendment “balancing” doctrine in 
light of what Foucault referred to as panopticism.24 In Part III, I argue that the 
generalized, arbitrary, and warrantless collection by government of its citizens’ 
private communications, merely because those citizens wish to keep those 
communications private, is in direct conflict with the constitutional intent to protect 
individuals from undue state power. In Part IV, I return to an analysis of current 
Fourth Amendment doctrine to argue that this doctrine, based on a 
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test, neglects the important constitutional value 
of trust. I make the case that one of the core principles that gave life to the 
Constitution is the philosophy that reciprocal trust between government and its 
citizens is necessary for a healthy democratic society. 
I. A GENTLE INTRODUCTION TO CRYPTOGRAPHY 
A. Why Encrypt? 
The practice of encrypting communications to ensure (or attempt to ensure) their 
privacy has existed in one form or another for thousands of years.25 While not all of 
the examples over the past 4000 years would appear on their surface to be 
                                                                                                                 
approval on a case-by-case basis. 
 23. See infra Part II.A–B. 
 24. Panopticism is defined as the type of power applied by the State to individual 
citizens in the form of continuous individual supervision. See Michel Foucault, Truth and 
Juridical Forms, in POWER: ESSENTIAL WORKS OF FOUCAULT 1954–1984, at 1, 70 (James D. 
Faubion ed., Robert Hurley et al. trans., The New Press 1994). 
 25. The earliest known evidence of secret writing—or encryption—dates back to about 
1900 BC. See DAVID KAHN, THE CODEBREAKERS: THE STORY OF SECRET WRITING 71 (1967). 
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encryption as we now know it, different forms of cryptography26 have been used by 
priests,27 emperors,28 diplomats,29 generals,30 spies,31 merchants,32 insurgents,33 
dissidents,34 criminals,35 prisoners, and lovers.36 Clearly, the specific reasons 
behind an individual’s desire to obscure or otherwise hide her communications or 
                                                                                                                 
 
 26. Cryptography is the science of creating and using methods of obscuring or 
disguising messages with ciphers, codes, and other techniques so that only certain people can 
read the original (unencrypted) message. A cipher is a method of encrypting any text 
regardless of its content. A code is a system of communication that relies on a prearranged 
mapping of meanings, for example, a codebook. Cryptology is the study of cryptography and 
cryptanalysis. See id. at xiii–xvi. 
 27. Examples of religious uses of cryptography range from ancient Egyptian hieroglyphics 
on tomb walls, to the use of substitutions in Hebrew Holy Scriptures, to fourteenth-century 
Koranic writings, to Viking Age cipher runes. It is not always clear what the reasoning was 
behind encrypting religious texts, but scholars generally believe that the secrecy added to the 
mystery and arcane magical powers of religious writings. See id. at 71–98. 
 28. It is believed that Julius Caesar used a cipher to encrypt his messages to Cicero and 
others, which substituted the letters of the original text with letters three places further down the 
alphabet. To this day, such substitution ciphers are called Caesar ciphers. See id. at 83–84. 
 29. Blaise de Vigenère, the inventor of the archetype of polyalphabetic substitution 
cipher systems, was first exposed to cryptology in 1549 while he was a diplomat in service 
to the Duke of Nevers. Id. at 145–46. 
 30. In eleventh century China, the military document Wu-ching tsung-yao (“Essentials 
from Military Classics”) prescribed a code of forty items ranging from requests for arrows to 
reports from front lines. Id. at 73. 
 31. Artha-śāstra, the classic Indian work on statecraft, describes the espionage service 
of India and recommends that spies be given assignments via secret writings. Id. at 74. 
 32. An early example of encryption to protect valuable intellectual property was found in a 
3500-year-old remnant of a Mesopotamian potter’s cipher to protect his new glazing formula. 
BRUCE SCHNEIER, SECRETS AND LIES: DIGITAL SECURITY IN A NETWORKED WORLD 86 (2000). 
 33. During the French wars of religion, Huguenots encrypted their internal 
correspondence. The decryption of one of these messages by the French royal army in 1628 
led to the surrender of Huguenot forces at Realmont. KAHN, supra note 25, at 157. 
 34. For their official correspondence, Tibetans use a cipher called “rin-spuns,” named 
for its inventor Rin-c’(hhen-)spuns(-pa), who lived in the fourteenth century. Id. at 84. 
 35. During the era of Prohibition in the United States, bootleggers used encoded radio 
messages to coordinate the movement between ships smuggling liquor from overseas and the 
small speedboats that would bring the cargo ashore. Id. at 802–03. 
 36. Ovid, in the Art of Love, counseled secret lovers on how to keep their 
correspondence secret: 
If the guard sees through these tricks, she can go one better: / Offer her back to 
write on, be your letter. / Safe and undetectable by the eye / Is writing in milk—
later, just apply / A sprinkling of coal-dust and presto! you can read. / Or write 
in oil of linseed / Oozing from a stalk of flax— / And your words are invisible 
on what seems blank wax. 
OVID, THE ART OF LOVE bk. 3, at 157 (James Michie trans., Modern Library 2002) (c. 2 C.E.) 
(emphasis in original). 
In the nineteenth century, lovers would secretly contact one another through encrypted 
messages in so-called agony columns of newspapers. Unfortunately for the communicants, 
most of these messages were encrypted using elementary encryption methods, such that almost 
anyone could decipher these messages with a bit of effort. KAHN, supra note 25, at 775. 
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papers from unwanted gazes can vary widely. But there is a common thread 
throughout history of a strong—perhaps innate—need for people to have the ability 
to keep certain things secret.37 
One of the more dramatic historical uses of cryptography—and a cautionary tale 
for those tempted to use weak encryption methods—can be found in the tragic tale 
of Mary, Queen of Scots.38 While imprisoned in England by Queen Elizabeth I, 
Mary used a cipher to encrypt her correspondence with her supporters.39 Queen 
Elizabeth, correctly sensing threats to her government (and person) at home and 
abroad, tasked Sir Francis Walsingham with establishing an espionage network 
throughout England and Europe.40 Walsingham’s agents intercepted Mary’s 
encrypted messages and discovered a plot to assassinate Elizabeth and install Mary 
in her place.41 Mary’s coconspirators were quickly arrested and subsequently 
executed. Mary was tried in October of that year; in February 1587, Queen 
Elizabeth signed Mary’s death warrant, and she was beheaded.42 
At its core, the ability to keep things secret is a form of power.43 Similarly, the 
ability to learn someone’s secrets—either surreptitiously or overtly—and use the 
information learned is also a form of power. The conflict between the individual’s 
power to keep her secrets from the government and the government’s power to 
learn those secrets creates tensions that tend to manifest themselves in arguments 
over privacy. In this context, “the right to privacy has everything to do with 
delineating the legitimate limits of governmental power.”44 
Until relatively recently, however, those who wished to keep their 
communications secret could be much more confident in their privacy than they can 
today. Simply finding a secluded area well out of earshot of potential 
eavesdroppers could defeat all adversaries until the invention of the parabolic 
microphone and similar technologies. If the parties weren’t able to have such a 
face-to-face private conversation, they could encrypt their letters using 
                                                                                                                 
 
 37.  
Without the ability to keep secrets, individuals lose the capacity to distinguish 
themselves from others, to maintain independent lives, to be complete and 
autonomous persons . . . . This does not mean that a person actually has to keep 
secrets to be autonomous, just that she must possess the ability to do so. The 
ability to keep secrets implies the ability to disclose secrets selectively, and so 
the capacity for selective disclosure at one’s own discretion is important to 
individual autonomy as well. 
KIM LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON LAW 302 
(1988) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 
 38. SIMON SINGH, THE CODE BOOK: THE EVOLUTION OF SECRECY FROM MARY QUEEN OF 
SCOTS TO QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY 32–44 (1999). 
 39. Id. at 37–40. 
 40. See id. at 39. 
 41. Id. at 40–41. 
 42. Id. at 42–44. 
 43. While “[a] measure of control over secrecy and openness—and thus of one form of 
power—is needed in personal life for equilibrium, liberty, even survival,” when linked, 
“secrecy and political power are dangerous in the extreme.” SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE 
ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 106 (1982). 
 44. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 737 (1989). 
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then-unbreakable ciphers.45 Even long after the proliferation of the telephone, it 
was difficult to trace incoming calls due to the slow mechanical equipment used by 
the carriers, even with a warrant.46 
Today, networked computing and communication has permeated everyday life.47 
For most of us, significant amounts of information describing our purchases, 
comings and goings, likes and dislikes, circles of friends, socioeconomic statuses, 
affiliations, and thoughts now make their way across countless unknown networks 
to be stored on countless unknown servers and potentially accessible to any number 
of interested parties. We may choose to willingly share some of this data, or we 
may concede that certain pieces of information are analogous to our activities while 
walking down a public street—it may be impossible to control their observation 
and dissemination. But there are certain segments of our lives that we may only 
choose to share with a select few. For example, you may see me walk into a bank’s 
local branch and might therefore assume that I have an account there. I am likely 
aware of this fact, but it does not follow that I want to share my account balances 
with you as well. In another example, you may send an e-mail rather than a letter to 
your spouse, but that does not necessarily mean that your expectations of privacy in 
that e-mail are any different than if you sealed an envelope and entrusted it to the 
care of the Postal Service. Here, cryptography helps to regain some control over 
what data we choose to make public. 
B. A Political History of Encryption in the United States 
The U.S. government’s views on the general availability of strong cryptography 
are complicated. Since World War I, the government has been heavily invested in 
the research and development of cryptographic systems. It had largely managed to 
keep a lid on these methods into the 1960s.48 In 1967, despite the NSA’s best 
                                                                                                                 
 
 45. The Vigenère cipher was considered unbreakable in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. See SINGH, supra note 38, at 62–63. Successfully encrypting letters was, however, 
no guarantee that the intended recipient would ever receive them. 
 46. Prior to the invention of the transistor or the microprocessor, the routing of 
telephone calls took place using the equivalent of “stone knives and bearskins”—giant 
mechanical switches “jam-packed with wipers and ratchets and pawls and blades and other 
mechanical clockwork.” PHIL LAPSLEY, EXPLODING THE PHONE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE 
TEENAGERS AND OUTLAWS WHO HACKED MA BELL 42–44 (2013). 
 47. William Gibson has aptly described this phenomenon as the eversion of cyberspace. 
See David Wallace-Wells, William Gibson: The Art of Fiction No. 211, PARIS REV., Summer 
2011, at 107, available at http://www.theparisreview.org/interviews/6089/the-art-of-fiction
-no-211-william-gibson. That is, the Internet (“cyberspace”) we once thought of as elsewhere, 
accessible only through large, bulky boxes that were found only on desktops, and later, smaller 
(but still bulky) boxes we could optimistically use on our laps, has “colonized” our world—
both physically, through networked computers we carry in our pocket and archaically call 
“phones,” and sociologically, through our increased dependence on its availability. See William 
Gibson, Op-Ed., Google’s Earth, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2010, at A23. 
 48. World War I was the first war to be fought with the general availability of radio 
technology. Since radio broadcasts were, by definition, available to anyone with a receiver, 
governments quickly realized that some kind of cryptographic system had to be employed to 
ensure the secrecy of communications. The rapid advance of technology following the war, 
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efforts to quash it, David Kahn published The Codebreakers, the first nontechnical 
history of cryptography, which included descriptions of the technologies used in 
encryption and why they were important.49 Kahn’s book sparked a renewed and 
widespread interest in cryptography among scientists and engineers working 
outside the walls of the NSA.50 By the early 1970s, the NSA conceded that 
cryptographic technologies should be made available to other agencies within the 
U.S. government. Together with the National Bureau of Standards, the NSA 
solicited industry proposals for a new cryptographic standard, which eventually 
resulted in the publication of the Data Encryption Standard (DES) in 1977.51 
But the cryptographic genie truly left the government bottle in 1976 with the 
publication of a paper by two Stanford University researchers, which described a 
new cryptographic concept called “public key cryptography.”52 By 1977, three 
young MIT professors—Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Len Adleman—built upon 
the concepts articulated in this paper to invent the first public-key encryption 
system, naming it with their initials (RSA).53 Rivest was invited to present his work 
at the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) annual meeting in 
                                                                                                                 
coupled with secret research done under the auspices of what would become the NSA, 
yielded improved automation and security of these secret government cryptosystems. See 
WHITFIELD DIFFIE & SUSAN LANDAU, PRIVACY ON THE LINE: THE POLITICS OF WIRETAPPING 
AND ENCRYPTION 49–53 (1998); KAHN, supra note 25, at 298–350. 
 49. Kahn’s original manuscript contained information about the NSA, and the agency 
made attempts to stop its publication, including writing negative reviews of the work to be 
disseminated through the press to discredit him. JAMES BAMFORD, THE PUZZLE PALACE: A 
REPORT ON AMERICA’S MOST SECRET AGENCY 168–69 (1982). Kahn and his publisher 
eventually agreed to remove material concerning the relationship between the NSA and its 
British counterpart, the Government Communications Headquarters. Id. at 171–72. 
 50. The NSA began losing its monopoly on cryptography research even within the U.S. 
government. In 1944, a young German immigrant named Horst Feistel was granted U.S. 
citizenship, a security clearance, and a job at the Air Force Cambridge Research Center 
(AFCRC), a U.S. Air Force think tank dedicated to improving the cryptographic systems 
used in the identification of friendly—and unfriendly—aircraft. DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra 
note 48, at 56–57. After the NSA discovered this research, it shut down the AFCRC and 
appropriated the technology. Feistel then took his research to the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT), Mitre, and eventually IBM. Id. 
 51. See SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, U.S. SENATE, UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY: 
INVOLVEMENT OF NSA IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DATA ENCRYPTION STANDARD (1978), 
available at http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/pdfs/95nsa.pdf. 
 52. Whitfield Diffie & Martin E. Hellman, New Directions in Cryptography, 22 IEEE 
TRANSACTIONS ON INFO. THEORY 644 (1976), available at http://www-ee.stanford.edu
/~hellman/publications/24.pdf. The revolutionary concept behind public-key cryptography 
lies in its ability to “split” the cryptographic key into two parts, a public key and a private 
key. Applying the mathematical principles I discuss in Part I.C, infra, Diffie and Hellman 
showed that, using their approach—aptly named the Diffie-Hellman key exchange—one 
could generate public-private key pairs in such a way that it was computationally infeasible 
to derive the private key solely from the public key. Id. Thus, Alice could share her public 
key with the world, which would allow Bob (and others) to encrypt messages to her using 
that key that could only be decrypted with Alice’s secret key. 
 53. See R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir & L. Adelman, A Method for Obtaining Digital 
Signatures and Public-Key Cryptosystems, COMM. ACM, Feb. 1978, at 120, 126, available 
at http://ocw.bib.upct.es/pluginfile.php/5337/mod_resource/content/1/rsa_base.pdf. 
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October 1977, but the IEEE received a letter warning that Rivest’s talk was a 
potential violation of the U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR),54 
since foreign nationals would likely be present at the meeting.55 
The ITAR regulates the import and export of defense-related goods and services 
by designating such items to the United States Munitions List (USML), as 
authorized under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA).56 Items listed on the 
USML, unless otherwise exempted, require a license to import or export.57 In the 
past, these items included “[c]ryptographic (including key management) systems, 
equipment, assemblies, modules, integrated circuits, components or software with 
the capability of maintaining secrecy or confidentiality of information or 
information systems.”58 
The government’s use of ITAR to control the import and export of nonmilitary 
cryptographic systems and software was curtailed in 1996 when a California 
federal district court was asked to decide whether the ITAR licensing requirements 
constituted unlawful prior restraint, thus violating the First Amendment right to 
free expression.59 The plaintiff in Bernstein was a University of California, 
Berkeley graduate student in mathematics who developed an encryption algorithm 
he called “Snuffle.”60 Bernstein had documented his algorithm both as an academic 
                                                                                                                 
 
 54. 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2012). 
 55. See Stephen H. Unger, Privacy, Cryptography and Free Research, IEEE TECH. & 
SOC’Y, Dec. 1977, at 8. It was later discovered that the letter’s author worked for the NSA. 
The NSA denied any connection with the letter, and Rivest presented his paper at the IEEE 
conference in October. DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 48, at 61–62. 
 56. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1). 
 57. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(b)(2). The USML divides munitions into twenty-one categories. 
Category XIII of the USML (“Auxiliary Military Equipment”) included all cryptographic 
systems, but has since been revised to include only those “cryptographic devices, software, 
and components specifically designed, developed, modified, adapted, or configured for 
military applications.” 22 C.F.R § 121.1 (2013). As of January 6, 2014, new Category XIII 
language applies and includes in part: 
Information security or information assurance systems and equipment, 
cryptographic devices, software, and components, as follows: 
. . . Military or intelligence cryptographic (including key management) 
systems, equipment, assemblies, modules, integrated circuits, components, and 
software (including their cryptographic interfaces) capable of maintaining 
secrecy or confidentiality of information or information systems, including 
equipment or software for tracking, telemetry, and control (TT&C) encryption 
and decryption. 
22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (2014). 
 58. 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (1996). 
 59. See Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1146–47 (9th Cir. 1999) 
[hereinafter Bernstein IV] (affirming district court decision that export regulations on 
encryption items are unconstitutional), withdrawn pending en banc reh’g, 192 F.3d 1308 
(9th Cir. 1999). 
 60. Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1429 (N.D. Cal. 1996) 
[hereinafter Bernstein I]; Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 945 F. Supp. 1279, 1283 (N.D. 
Cal. 1996) [hereinafter Bernstein II]; Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 974 F. Supp. 1288, 
1293 (N.D. Cal. 1997) [hereinafter Bernstein III]. Bernstein I and II challenged the 
encryption export control provisions of ITAR. After Bernstein II, President Clinton shifted 
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paper and in computer source code, and he wished to publish and otherwise 
communicate his findings.61 When he sought a determination from the State 
Department as to whether his paper and source code were controlled under ITAR, 
the State Department replied that Bernstein’s source code was a defense article 
under Category XIII of ITAR and therefore subject to licensing by the State 
Department prior to export.62 
Bernstein filed suit in the Northern District of California, seeking a declaratory 
judgment against the U.S. Department of State to prevent it from enforcing ITAR 
against him.63 The court observed that “[Bernstein’s] paper, an academic writing 
explaining [his] scientific work . . . is speech of the most protected kind.”64 As to 
the source code, the court pointed out that “Bernstein’s encryption system is 
written, albeit in computer language,” and the court could “find no meaningful 
difference between computer language . . . and German or French.”65 In Bernstein 
II, the court held that the licensing requirement for cryptographic software under 
Category XIII of the USML was an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech, stating 
that “even if a government may constitutionally impose content-neutral prohibitions 
on a particular manner of speech, it may not condition that speech on obtaining a 
license or permit from a government official in that official’s boundless discretion.”66 
In 1982, the inventors of RSA founded a corporation around their cryptographic 
algorithm, and they proposed—unsuccessfully—that RSA become a federal 
cryptographic standard, like DES.67 But until the prospect of global e-commerce 
                                                                                                                 
ITAR licensing authority for encryption exports to the Department of Commerce. See Exec. 
Order No. 13,026, 61 Fed. Reg. 58,767 (Nov. 19, 1996); see also Encryption Items 
Transferred from the U.S. Munitions List to the Commerce Control List, 61 Fed. Reg. 
68,572 (Dec. 30, 1996). In Bernstein III, the district court held that the Commerce 
Department’s encryption export regulations were constitutionally indistinguishable from 
ITAR with respect to encryption and were therefore unconstitutional. 974 F. Supp. at 1306–08. 
 61. Bernstein I, 922 F. Supp. at 1429–30. Source code is the text of a computer program 
and is generally written in a high-level language that is two or more steps removed from 
machine language, which is a low-level language. High-level languages are closer to natural 
language than low-level languages, which direct the functioning of the computer. Source 
code must be translated by way of a translating program into machine language before it can 
be read by a computer. The object code is the output of that translation. It is possible to write 
a source program in high-level language without knowing about the actual functions of the 
computer that carry out the program. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPUTER SCIENCE 962, 1263–
64 (Anthony Ralston & Edwin D. Reilly eds., 3d ed. 1993). 
 62. Bernstein I, 922 F. Supp. at 1430. 
 63. Id. at 1428. 
 64. Id. at 1434. 
 65. Id. at 1434–35. 
 66. 945 F. Supp. at 1286 (emphasis in original) (quoting Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g 
Co., 486 U.S. 750, 764 (1988)). The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Bernstein IV was withdrawn 
when the court voted to rehear the case en banc, and then the case settled before the en banc 
decision was rendered. See Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, No. C 95-0582 MHP, 2004 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6672, at *2 (Apr. 19, 2004). Therefore, the decision in Bernstein IV is no 
longer valid, even though the underlying decision in Bernstein III presumably is. 
 67. In 1982, the U.S. government solicited proposals for a national public-key 
cryptography standard. Solicitation for Public Key Cryptographic Algorithms, 47 Fed. Reg. 
28,445 (June 30, 1982). RSA Data Security prepared a proposal to make RSA the national 
standard. The NSA, however, blocked their submission by requesting that the plan to 
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became feasible through the rapid worldwide adoption of the Internet, commercial 
interest in cryptographic systems remained a niche business.68 The reawakened 
interest in cryptographic systems remained in this semidormant state until someone 
took steps to put strong cryptography in the hands of the general public.69 
In 1991, a computer programmer named Phil Zimmermann wrote a program that 
used the RSA public-key cryptographic algorithm to protect the privacy of e-mail; 
he called the program “Pretty Good Privacy”—PGP for short—and made it 
publicly available over the Internet.70 Zimmermann wrote and published PGP in 
response to Senate Bill 266, an omnibus anticrime bill, which contained a hidden 
requirement that would have forced makers of cryptographic equipment to insert 
secret “back doors” into their products so that the government could decrypt and 
read anyone’s encrypted messages.71 Zimmermann’s goal was to get strong 
                                                                                                                 
develop a national public-key cryptography standard be dropped. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, GAO/OSI-94-2, COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY: FEDERAL POLICY AND ACTIONS 5 (1993). 
 68. Cryptographic systems to ensure secured communications remained a tough sell 
(outside of governments) throughout the 1980s. For much of this time, the selling of 
cryptography was likened to the selling of insurance, in that the customer was expected to pay 
to protect against an event that may never happen. See DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 48, at 46. 
 69. The term strong cryptography—as opposed to weak cryptography—has no precise 
definition, since the standard against which we might measure “strong cryptography” today 
will undoubtedly change over time as computers become more powerful and research reveals 
new cryptographic techniques. For the purposes of this Article, I will borrow a definition 
from Bruce Schneier: “There are two kinds of cryptography in this world: cryptography that 
will stop your kid sister from reading your files, and cryptography that will stop major 
governments from reading your files. [Strong cryptography is] the latter.” BRUCE SCHNEIER, 
APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY, at xix (2d. ed 1996). 
Another critical characteristic of successful, strong cryptosystems is their adherence to 
what is known as Kerckhoff’s Principle, which states that the security of an encryption 
scheme must depend only on the secrecy of the key(s) and not on the secrecy of the 
algorithm or methods. See NIELS FERGUSON, BRUCE SCHNEIER & TADAYOSHI KOHNO, 
CRYPTOGRAPHY ENGINEERING: DESIGN PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 24–25 
(2010). The reasoning behind this important principle is based in the overall security of the 
system—the fewer the secrets that one must keep in order to ensure a system’s security, the 
easier it will be to maintain that security. Every secret in a cryptosystem is a potential failure 
point for that system. 
 70. See Elizabeth Lauzon, The Philip Zimmermann Investigation: The Start of the Fall 
of Export Restrictions on Encryption Software Under First Amendment Free Speech Issues, 
48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1307, 1321–22 (1998). 
 71. See 1 PHILIP ZIMMERMANN, THE OFFICIAL PGP USER’S GUIDE 5–7 (1995) (discussing the 
reasons for writing, publishing, and using PGP). While these measures ultimately failed, it has 
since been discovered that the NSA has been conducting a secret program to establish “back 
doors” into cryptographic systems and other security products by collaborating directly with 
technology companies. See, e.g, Nicole Perlroth, Jeff Larson & Scott Shane, N.S.A. Able To Foil 
Basic Safeguards of Privacy on Web, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2013, at A1. These efforts, revealed 
through the formerly secret documents leaked by Edward Snowden, have been roundly criticized 
by experts and security companies as bad for security. See Ed Felten, NSA Apparently 
Undermining Standards, Security, Confidence, FREEDOM TO TINKER (Sept. 9, 2013), https://
freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/felten/nsa-apparently-undermining-standards-security-confidence/; 
Dan Goodin, Stop Using NSA-Influenced Code in Our Products, RSA Tells Customers, ARS 
TECHNICA (Sept. 19, 2013, 7:43 PM), http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/09/stop-using-nsa
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cryptography into the hands of everyone, explaining that, until he published PGP, 
“ordinary people and grassroots political organizations mostly have not had access 
to affordable ‘military grade’ public-key cryptographic technology.”72 
The Internet being a global medium, copies of Zimmermann’s PGP quickly 
found their way outside U.S. borders, a violation of the AECA and ITAR.73 
Additionally, there was some speculation that Zimmermann’s use of the RSA 
algorithm infringed the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman patent, although the claim was 
probably pretextual.74 In February 1993, Zimmermann was visited by U.S. Customs 
Service agents who were investigating a complaint from RSA Data Security 
alleging the theft and international shipment of their intellectual property.75 The 
seed of this initial inquiry quickly bloomed into an investigation of possible ITAR 
violations by a U.S. Attorney.76 For years, Zimmermann remained under an 
investigatory cloud but was never indicted, most likely due to the inexplicable 
contradictions posed by the export restrictions articulated in ITAR.77 
                                                                                                                 
-influence-code-in-our-product-rsa-tells-customers/; Matthew Green, On the NSA, FEW 
THOUGHTS ON CRYPTOGRAPHIC ENGINEERING (Sept. 6, 2013, 2:27 AM), http://
blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/09/on-nsa.html; Matthew Green, The Many Flaws of 
Dual_EC_DRBG, FEW THOUGHTS ON CRYPTOGRAPHIC ENGINEERING (Sept. 18, 2013, 7:28 PM), 
http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/09/the-many-flaws-of-dualecdrbg.html? 
[hereinafter Green, Many Flaws]; David Meyer, Dear NSA, Thanks for Making Us All Insecure, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 6, 2013) http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-09
-06/dear-nsa-thanks-for-making-us-all-insecure. 
 72. 1 ZIMMERMANN, supra note 71, at 7. To further enable the spread of PGP as far and as 
fast as possible, Zimmermann released his software as open-source freeware, giving everyone 
full and free access to the underlying source code used to implement RSA. 2 id. at 96–98. 
 73. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. As the court in Bernstein II observed, 
“[i]t seems reasonably clear that uploading an item to an Internet site that can be accessed in 
a foreign country constitutes ‘sending’ a defense article out of the country.” 945 F. Supp. 
1279, 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1996). “Furthermore, exportation as defined by the ITAR would 
appear to include publication where publication, such as posting software on the Internet or 
distributing it freely among colleagues, could be said to be tantamount to sending it out of 
the United States ‘in any manner.’” Id. at 1288 (quoting 22 C.F.R. § 120.17(a)(1) (1996)); 
see also 22 C.F.R. §§ 120.1–120.9. 
 74. MIT was granted U.S. Patent 4,405,829 for a “Cryptographic Communications 
System and Method” that described the RSA algorithm in 1983. Cryptographic Commc’ns 
Sys. & Method, U.S. Patent No. 4,405,829 (filed Dec. 14, 1977) (issued Sept. 20, 1983). The 
patent would have expired on September 21, 2000, but the algorithm was released into the 
public domain by RSA Security on September 6, 2000. Press Release, RSA Security Inc., 
RSA Security Releases RSA Encryption Algorithm into Public Domain (Sept. 6, 2000), 
available at http://www.linuxtoday.com/infrastructure/2000090600606PRCYSW. 
 75. See STEVEN LEVY, CRYPTO: HOW THE CODE REBELS BEAT THE GOVERNMENT—
SAVING PRIVACY IN THE DIGITAL AGE 287–88 (2001). From the start, it was clear that the 
U.S. Customs agents were ill prepared to understand the technical ramifications of the 
cryptographic software. They asked Zimmermann questions about the means he used to 
distribute PGP overseas, but Zimmermann had to explain to them the basic ideas behind 
cryptography and the distribution of data over the Internet. Id. at 287; see also DIFFIE & 
LANDAU, supra note 48, at 205–06; Lauzon, supra note 70, at 1327. 
 76. See LEVY, supra note 75, at 288; Lauzon, supra note 70, at 1327. 
 77. The U.S. Department of Justice investigation of Zimmermann closed without 
comment from the U.S. Attorney on January 11, 1996. See Significant Moments in PGP’s 
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Since the mid-1990s, the civilian and commercial use of cryptographic systems 
has become widespread, driven initially by concerns for the safety of financial data in 
electronic commerce and electronic banking but eventually making its way into 
almost every aspect of our electronic lives.78 Despite subsequent attempts by the U.S. 
government to regain exclusive control over the research, implementation, and 
proliferation of cryptographic technologies, strong crypto has made its way around 
the globe.79 This tension between governments and their citizens regarding the use of 
                                                                                                                 
History: Zimmermann Case Dropped, PHILZIMMERMAN.COM (Jan. 12, 1996, 11:37 PM), 
https://www.philzimmermann.com/EN/news/PRZ_case_dropped.html. It was clear to many 
commentators, however, that confusion over ITAR export regulations made enforcement 
difficult and often absurd. For example, Bruce Schneier’s 1994 book, Applied Cryptography, 
supra note 69, also attracted the attention of the U.S. government, as it contained detailed 
mathematical descriptions and explanations of many cryptographic systems. Under the ITAR 
export regulations, the book itself could be shipped internationally, as the restrictions on the 
export of cryptographic systems appeared to apply only to strong cryptography in digital 
form. That is, the book could be exported, but a disk containing the book’s contents could 
not. This interpretation was confirmed when cryptography researcher Phil Karn applied for a 
“commodities jurisdiction” to export the book along with a floppy disk containing code from 
the book. The U.S. Department of State replied to Karn that the book could be exported, but 
the floppy disk could not. See Letter from Thomas E. McNamara, Assistant Secretary of 
State for Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Philip R. Karn, Jr. (June 13, 
1995), available at http://www.toad.com/gnu/export/mcnamara-response.html. As if to 
thumb its nose at this bizarre export policy, the MIT Press published a book that contained 
nothing but the source code to the entire PGP program. See LEVY, supra note 75, at 290. The 
933-page book has since become a collector’s item, with mint condition copies selling for 
$200–$300. See PGP: Source Code and Internals, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com
/PGP-Internals-Philip-R-Zimmermann/dp/0262240394. 
 78. Most modern encryption technology operates “behind the curtain” for the average 
person. For example, every modern web browser contains cryptographic functionality that 
enables users to establish secure connections to websites using established protocols like 
Transport Layer Security (TLS), or its predecessor, Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), but these 
protocols are designed to require little or no technical expertise from web users. See William 
Stallings, SSL: Foundation for Web Security, INTERNET PROTOCOL J., June 1998, at 20, 
available at http://www.cisco.com/web/about/ac123/ac147/archived_issues/ipj_1-1/ipj_1-1.pdf. 
Similarly, the invention and widespread use of computer network access through wireless 
radio technology (WiFi) led to the establishment of encryption protocols to prevent 
electronic eavesdropping on open radio channels. See WI-FI ALLIANCE, THE STATE OF WI-FI 
SECURITY: WI-FI CERTIFIED WPA2 DELIVERS ADVANCED SECURITY TO HOMES, ENTERPRISES 
AND MOBILE DEVICES (2012), available at http://davidhoglund.typepad.com/files/20120229
_state_of_wi-fi_security_09may2012_updated_cert.pdf. 
 79. In 1993, the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) solicited 
public comment on a proposed Escrowed Encryption Standard. See A Proposed Federal 
Information Processing Standard for an Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES), 58 Fed. Reg. 
40,791, 40,791–93 (Jul. 30, 1993). This initiative was born out of the U.S. government’s fear 
of losing the ability to eavesdrop on international communications due to the widespread use 
of strong cryptography. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor Is the Key: Cryptography, 
the Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 709, 743 (1995). The EES would 
solve this problem for the NSA by requiring all users of cryptography to allow the U.S. 
government to keep a copy of their secret encryption key(s) in escrow, so that encrypted 
communications could be deciphered by the U.S. government should it become necessary. 
Id. at 743–45. Unsurprisingly, the public reaction to the proposed EES was overwhelmingly 
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strong cryptography thus remains largely unresolved, and governments have sought 
alternative—often covert—methods of swinging the pendulum back to their side. 
C. The Details of Encryption (From 30,000 Feet) 
Before we progress too much further, I believe it is important to understand 
some of the fundamental mathematical principals behind cryptography. 
Legislatures and courts often deal with encryption indirectly, through analogy or 
metaphor, in an effort to show that since encryption is similar in some respects to 
some other, better known, or easier to understand, technology, it should be treated 
similarly under the law.80 As noted above, cryptography can hardly be described as 
a new technology, and yet, due in large part to the arcane mathematics involved and 
its relatively late appearance as a commonly available technology, courts and 
commentators have struggled to find a model of understanding that truly fits.81 
These metaphors are hit-and-miss, sometimes succeeding in capturing one aspect of 
                                                                                                                 
negative, despite the Clinton administration’s full-court marketing press. See DIFFIE 
& LANDAU, supra note 48, at 212; Froomkin, supra, at 744. Despite these protests, NIST 
adopted the EES on Feb. 9, 1994. See Approval of Federal Information Processing Standards 
Publication 185, Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES), 59 Fed. Reg. 5997, 5997–98 (Feb. 9, 
1994). After a vulnerability in the EES implementation was found, the already tepid 
acceptance by the industry fell even further, causing EES to fade into obscurity. See 
generally Matt Blaze, Key Escrow from a Safe Distance: Looking Back at the Clipper Chip, 
27 PROC. ANN. COMPUTER SECURITY APPLICATIONS CONF. 317 (2011), available at 
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2076777; Matt Blaze, Protocol Failure in the Escrowed 
Encryption Standard, 2 PROC. ACM CONF. ON COMPUTER & COMM. SECURITY 59 (1994), 
available at http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=191193. 
 80. This analogical approach is not unique to encryption, of course, as reasoning by 
analogy is one of the most familiar forms of legal reasoning. Cass R. Sunstein, On 
Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 741 (1993); see also EDWARD H. LEVI, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 10–15 (1949). This approach has had some success 
with certain technologies, such as railroads, that bear enough of a resemblance to their 
analogical cousins to fit existing models of thought. See Vincent M. Brannigan, 
Biotechnology: A First Order Technico-Legal Revolution, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 545, 549 
(1988) (observing that certain technologies do not require any changes to legal thought, 
whereas others required fundamental changes). Other, more disruptive, technologies have 
required more significant changes to existing schools of thought. Air travel, for example, 
represented an order of magnitude change in technology and required significant changes in 
the law to address such novel issues as trespass by air. See Hinman v. Pac. Air Transp., 84 
F.2d 755, 759 (9th Cir. 1936) (allowing airplanes the right to fly over private property). 
 81. See, e.g., 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (2013) (cryptography as a “device” and “munition”); A. 
Michael Froomkin, The Constitution and Encryption Regulation: Do We Need a “New 
Privacy”?, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 25, 26 (2000) (encrypted speech is a language); 
Froomkin, supra note 79, at 871 (“A cipher is armor around a communication much like a safe 
is armor around a possession.”); David Hricik, Lawyers Worry Too Much About Transmitting 
Client Confidences by Internet E-Mail, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 459, 493 (1998) (“Encryption 
is an electronic ‘lock-and-key’ technology . . . .”); Ronald L. Rivest, The Case Against 
Regulating Encryption Technology, SCI. AM., Oct. 1998, at 116, 116−17 (encryption 
technology as gloves to hide fingerprints); Lee Tien, Publishing Software as a Speech Act, 15 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 629, 672 (2000) (encryption as envelope containing the message). 
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cryptography, but often falling short in others.82 The problem with attempting to 
understand the use of cryptography solely through imperfect models of the concept 
is that these models can quickly outlive their usefulness, transforming from tools 
that assist our initial understanding into intellectual crutches that oversimplify 
critical issues.83 In this Article, I will therefore endeavor to avoid unnecessary 
metaphors wherever possible. In order to start from a solid foundation, it is 
necessary to truly understand the basic elements of cryptography and its uses. 
The act of transforming a message (plaintext or cleartext) into an enciphered 
form (ciphertext) in such a way as to hide its substance is called encryption.84 The 
operations that transform plaintext to ciphertext, and from ciphertext back to 
plaintext, are forms of mathematical functions.85 More precisely, if a particular 
function transforms plaintext to ciphertext, then the function that transforms that 
ciphertext back to plaintext is the original function’s inverse.86 Successful 
                                                                                                                 
 
 82. Courts and commentators are not blind to this issue, of course, but it has been noted 
that courts are often unprepared when trying to apply existing law to new technologies: 
“[a]nalogy is the only real road map for courts when technological change leaves them in 
unknown legal territory,” where the technology does “not fit neatly into existing categories.” 
Linda Greenhouse, What Level of Protection for Internet Speech?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 
1997, at D5. Analogy and metaphor are useful tools to begin one’s understanding of an 
abstract concept. As Max Black wrote, 
Why stretch and twist, press and expand, concepts in this way—Why try to see 
A as metaphorically B, when it literally is not B? . . . [B]ecause we often need to 
do so, the available literal resources of the language being insufficient to 
express our sense of the rich correspondences, interrelations, and analogies of 
domains conventionally separated; and because metaphorical thought and 
utterance sometimes embody insight expressible in no other fashion. 
Max Black, More About Metaphor, in METAPHOR AND THOUGHT 19, 33 (Andrew Ortony ed., 
2d ed. 1993). 
 83. Linguists, logicians, and philosophers have long been wary of the potential abuses 
of metaphor. The philosopher Max Black has stated that “[t]o draw attention to a 
philosopher’s metaphors is to belittle him—like praising a logician for his beautiful 
handwriting. Addiction to metaphor is held to be illicit, on the principle that whereof one can 
speak only metaphorically, thereof one ought not to speak at all.” Max Black, Metaphor, 55 
PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 273, 273 (1955). 
 84. SCHNEIER, supra note 69, at 1. It should be noted that message privacy or 
confidentiality is but one of the goals of a cryptographic system. Other objectives include data 
integrity (the prevention and detection of unwanted data manipulation), authentication (the 
identification of sender and recipient), and nonrepudiation (the prevention of entities from 
denying previous commitments or actions). See ALFRED J. MENEZES, PAUL C. VAN OORSCHOT 
& SCOTT A. VANSTONE, HANDBOOK OF APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY 4 (1997). A full examination 
of these fundamental goals of cryptography is beyond the scope of this Article, and for the 
purposes of this argument I will focus—somewhat superficially—on the goal of message 
confidentiality. I will strive mightily to keep the mathematics in this Article to a minimum. 
 85. See MENEZES ET AL., supra note 84, at 6–8. 
 86. See id. at 7–8. In order to uphold my promise to keep the mathematics to a minimum 
in this Article, I have glossed over a number of important mathematical principles necessary 
for these functions to operate as advertised. For example, in order for a plaintext message to 
be properly recovered, the encryption function and its inverse must both be special kinds of 
functions known as bijections. While this distinction is crucial to the mathematics behind 
118 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 90:101 
 
cryptosystems depend on special kinds of functions known as one-way functions 
and trapdoor functions.87 A one-way function is a function that is easy to compute 
but whose inverse is “computationally infeasible” to calculate.88 A trapdoor 
function is a one-way function with an additional property that contains 
information (the trapdoor function’s “secret”) that makes it computationally 
feasible to find its inverse.89 For the purposes of this Article, one can consider 
encryption as a trapdoor function and decryption as that trapdoor function’s 
inverse. That is, if Alice uses a trapdoor function to encrypt a message to Bob, it 
would be computationally difficult for anyone who is not privy to the “secret” of 
the trapdoor function—we can call this the key—to decrypt the resulting ciphertext 
via the inverse of Alice’s trapdoor function. 
The viability of modern computational cryptography therefore depends quite 
heavily on what is “computationally infeasible.” That is, mathematicians have not 
been able to prove with certainty that any true one-way functions exist.90 Since the 
existence of true one-way functions is unknown, the existence of true trapdoor 
functions is therefore also unknown.91 One does not have to be a mathematician to 
realize that this poses something of a problem for cryptography in general and the 
long-term secrecy of existing encrypted communications in particular. But while 
there may come a day when a method to easily invert one-way functions is 
discovered, thus pulling the rug out from under much of modern cryptography, 
mathematicians and cryptographers currently agree that that day has not yet 
arrived.92 For the time being, the continued viability of modern computational 
cryptographic techniques depends on the “computational infeasibility” of finding 
the inverses of trapdoor functions through “brute force” methods on current (and 
foreseeable) technologies.93 
                                                                                                                 
cryptography, it is not as important for the purposes of this Article. For those interested in a 
more complete description, see generally id. 
 87. See id. at 8–9. 
 88. Id. at 8. A common example of a one-way function is one which takes two very large 
prime numbers, p and q, and multiplies them to get a new number n, which, by definition, is 
divisible by 1, p, and q only. The number n is known as a semiprime number. Finding the 
number n is relatively easy, but if p and q are sufficiently large prime numbers, finding the 
factors p and q of n is computationally difficult, even with today’s most powerful computers. 
 89. Id. at 9. Building upon the example in note 88, supra, a trapdoor function would provide 
the additional information of either p or q, thus making the factorization of n much easier. 
 90. Id.; see also Jacob Ziv, In Search of a One-Way Function, in OPEN PROBLEMS IN 
COMMUNICATION AND COMPUTATION 104–05 (Thomas M. Cover & B. Gopinath eds., 1987). 
 91. MENEZES ET AL., supra note 84, at 9. 
 92. See Ziv, supra note 90, at 104–05. In fact, the finding of an easy solution to one-way 
functions is linked to the “P vs. NP” problem, one of the great unsolved problems in 
mathematics. Finding a solution to the “P vs. NP” problem would have a seismic impact on 
the world of mathematics far beyond the area of cryptography. See STEPHEN COOK, THE P 
VERSUS NP PROBLEM, available at http://www.claymath.org/sites/default/files/pvsnp.pdf. I 
address this lurking problem and its implications more fully in Part II.A, infra. 
 93. By “brute force” methods, I mean cryptanalytic attacks that attempt to decrypt an 
enciphered message by trying every possible decryption key until either the message is 
decrypted or all possible keys have been exhausted. See CHRISTOF PAAR & JAN PELZL, 
UNDERSTANDING CRYPTOGRAPHY: A TEXTBOOK FOR STUDENTS AND PRACTITIONERS 7 (2010). 
Such direct attacks on well-established and vetted encryption techniques are very rarely the 
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D. Who Uses Encryption? 
Even at the high levels of abstraction I’ve adopted in presenting the basics of 
cryptography above, it quickly becomes apparent that the mathematical principles 
behind cryptography are astoundingly complex and are best understood by—and 
left to—experts in the field. Fortunately for the rest of us, a great deal of progress 
has been made over the past few decades to make strong cryptography a generally 
available reality through (somewhat) user-accessible computer software.94 The 
explosive growth of Internet use in the 1990s yielded a storm of commercial 
cryptographic systems, some of it good, but much of it bad.95 In fact, the 
commercial appeal of making easy money by building a cryptographic system and 
selling it to worried customers as a security panacea led many security experts to 
warn the public to watch out for cryptographic “snake oil.”96 
                                                                                                                 
approach of those who make it their business to read the secret messages of others. Rather, it is 
generally much more fruitful to seek out gaps in the armor to exploit, which can take the form 
of implementation mistakes, poorly chosen cryptographic keys, and old-fashioned human 
weakness. See, e.g., Michael Eisen, What Exactly Are the NSA’s ‘Groundbreaking 
Cryptanalytic Capabilities’?, WIRED (Sept. 4, 2013, 9:29 AM), http://www.wired.com
/opinion/2013/09/black-budget-what-exactly-are-the-nsas-cryptanalytic-capabilities/ (examining 
possible theories behind NSA cryptanalytic capabilities); Dan Goodin, Private Crypto Key in 
Mission-Critical Hardware Menaces Electric Grids, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 22, 2012, 12:36 
PM), http://arstechnica.com/security/2012/08/mission-critical-hardware-flaw/ (reporting on 
poor cryptographic engineering resulting in a widespread vulnerability); Matthew Green, Is the 
Cryptopocalypse Nigh?, FEW THOUGHTS ON CRYPTOGRAPHIC ENGINEERING (Aug. 19, 2013, 
12:43 PM), http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/08/is-cryptopocalypse-nigh.html 
(showing that recent demonstrated attacks only apply to a small subset of cryptographic keys); 
Green, Many Flaws, supra note 71 (providing analysis of flaws in a cryptographic random 
number generator allegedly sabotaged by NSA); Micah F. Lee, No Really, the NSA Can’t Brute 
Force Your Crypto, MICAH LEE’S BLOG (Jan. 23, 2013, 7:11 PM), 
https://micahflee.com/2013/01/no-really-the-nsa-cant-break-your-crypto/ (demonstrating the 
computational infeasibility of brute force attacks on cryptographic keys using current 
technologies); The NSA’s Crypto “Breakthrough,” ECONOMIST (Sept. 2, 2013, 3:00 PM), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2013/09/breaking-cryptography (observing that the 
most likely answer to revelations of NSA decryption program question is the exploitation of 
bugs in cryptographic protocols). 
 94. Due to the high degree of expertise and sheer computational horsepower required, 
strong cryptography has long been the sole domain of governments and militaries. See LEVY, 
supra note 75, at 13–15; DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 48, at 49–59. In the early 1970s, 
however, a number of key research breakthroughs coincided with the rise of relatively cheap 
and powerful computers, initiating a cryptography renaissance. DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra 
note 48, at 59–63. 
 95. Most cryptographers will tell you that “cryptography is very difficult” but 
“[c]ryptography is the easy part” of cryptographic engineering. FERGUSON ET AL., supra note 
69, at 12–14. 
 96. The term itself is derived from a type of patent medicine called “snake oil” that was 
widely available during the nineteenth century. As applied, modern vendors of cryptographic 
snake oil were those selling a cryptographic product considered by experts to be bogus or 
flawed. See ZIMMERMANN, supra note 71, at 39–43; Matt Curtin, Snake Oil Warning Signs: 
Encryption Software To Avoid, INTERHACK RES. (Apr. 10, 1998), http://www.interhack.net
/people/cmcurtin/snake-oil-faq.html; Bruce Schneier, Snake Oil, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY 
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The commodification of the computer and the proliferation of near 
instantaneous electronic global communication has driven governments, 
businesses, and (to a somewhat lesser extent) individuals to make a special effort to 
keep their communications private.97 As noted earlier, this privacy interest is not a 
new concept. But unlike the historical examples of messages conveyed via stone, 
papyrus, paper, telegraph, or radio broadcast, the existence of a nearly ubiquitous 
data communication infrastructure has forced a reexamination and rebirth of 
communication and data security principles and practices. The complexity of 
modern communication protocols means that cryptography is only one element of a 
broader communications-security regime. An encryption mechanism by itself may 
be interesting for academic reasons, but it is fairly useless apart from a larger 
security system.98 The details behind this design philosophy are beyond the scope 
of this Article. For our purposes, I only note that, while cryptography is a critical 
part of any communications-security mechanism, it is generally not the piece of the 
security system that is the first to fail.99 
Despite the overall complexities and difficulties in engineering strong 
cryptographic systems, these systems have become essential components of the 
modern Internet.100 To date, most uses of encryption technologies remain largely 
invisible to the average Internet user. At best, this means that encryption is simply 
ignored; at worst, it gives users a false sense of security in poorly understood 
technologies.101 But growing popular awareness of computer security issues 
generally, and cryptography’s role in data protection specifically, has ignited a 
broad awakening of interest in, and use of, encryption technologies.102 And while 
                                                                                                                 
(Feb. 15, 1999), https://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-9902.html#snakeoil. Some of the 
more common signs of such snake oil are claims of “security through obscurity,” that is, 
claiming that the system must be kept secret; the use of “technobabble”; and blanket claims 
that the cryptographic system in question is “unbreakable.” Curtin, supra. 
 97. See DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 48, at 59–61. 
 98. See FERGUSON ET AL., supra note 69, at 4. 
 99. Like any complex system, the weaknesses of communication-security protocols are 
most often found in the joints between their subsystems. See id. at 4–5 (discussing the 
“weakest link” approach to security-system analysis); see also DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 
48, at 38–40. 
 100. Without the availability of strong cryptographic systems, our current systems of 
global finance, commerce, medicine, and government would likely face dire consequences, 
and may fail altogether. See Cracked Credibility, ECONOMIST, Sept. 14, 2013, at 65. 
 101. While it is true that both commercial and open source cryptographic applications 
can be found in some form in nearly every network-enabled technology today, their use is 
often limited to whatever default settings were installed with the application. This approach 
is designed with user convenience in mind, adhering to the unfortunately common principle 
that the more secure you make something, the less secure it becomes. This is cute shorthand 
for the phenomenon where users will often find (insecure) shortcuts around application 
security that gets in their way. See Donold A. Norman, When Security Gets in the Way, 
INTERACTIONS, Nov.−Dec. 2009, at 60. 
 102. Interestingly enough, the trend toward increased user education in cryptography and 
other computer-security basics has been encouraged by the U.S. government. For example, 
since 2004, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security has sponsored “National Cyber 
Security Awareness Month” each October, marking the occasion each year by providing 
security tips, including recommendations to encrypt files. See, e.g., National Cyber Security 
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truly ubiquitous encryption is not yet a reality, a growing number of individuals, 
businesses, and other organizations have taken steps to keep their messages and 
data secret by encrypting their contents.103 
E. Why Does Encryption Matter? 
Cryptographers generally agree that strong cryptography, implemented and used 
properly, poses a significant, and often realistically insurmountable, obstacle to 
would-be eavesdroppers, even those with access to nearly unlimited resources like 
the NSA.104 One problem with this assumption, however, is the fact that it is not 
very “future proof.” That is to say, the known theory, techniques, and computing 
power of today will most likely be viewed as quaint in the not-too-distant future, if 
recent progress is any indication, and what is thought of as computationally 
infeasible today may very well be child’s play in several decades (or fewer).105 
To illustrate how technological and theoretical improvements can affect the 
future security of messages encrypted using today’s standards, we can look to 
cryptographic key length.106 As late as 2005, a 1024-bit RSA public key was 
considered by standards organizations to provide adequate security for the 
                                                                                                                 
Awareness Month 2014, DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY (Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov
/national-cyber-security-awareness-month; Security Tip (ST05-017): Cybersecurity for 
Electronic Devices, US-CERT (Feb. 6, 2013), https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/tips/st05-017. 
 103. Of course, there are perfectly legitimate reasons, both technical and personal, that may 
influence an individual’s or organization’s decision to keep some data freely accessible and 
readable. In fact, some computer-security experts have warned that the ubiquitous encryption of 
all Internet traffic would hinder the ability to detect viruses and other malware as it is shared 
over networks. See, e.g., Rob Holquist, Growing Network-Encryption Use Puts Systems at 
Risk, IEEE COMPUTING NOW (Aug. 2011), http://www.computer.org/portal/web/computingnow
/news/growing-network-encryption-use-puts-systems-at-risk (discussing how network 
encryption protocols widely used in the Internet could be used to hide malicious activity). I do 
not address these issues in this Article but instead focus on the warrantless government search 
and seizure of all encrypted data and its legal and societal implications. 
 104. Questions of flawed implementations aside, the strength of a cryptographic scheme 
is not achieved through the secrecy of the scheme itself (see the discussion of Kerckhoff’s 
Principle in supra note 69) but through the mathematical soundness of the underlying 
algorithm along with other factors such as the chosen lengths of the cryptographic keys. See 
SCHNEIER, supra note 69, at 166–67. 
 105. Following an observed trend in technology that has continued for over fifty years, it 
is estimated that the efficiency of computing equipment divided by price doubles every 
eighteen months and increases by a factor of ten every five years. Id. at 167. If this 
conjecture—known as Moore’s Law, named for Intel cofounder Gordon Moore who first 
described this trend—continues to hold true, the fastest computers in fifty years will be 1010, 
or ten billion, times faster than the computers of today. 
 106. The size of the keys used in cryptographic systems is often used as a shorthand 
measure of cryptographic strength. While this is not a perfect or complete measurement, key 
length does provide an indication as to the degree of security a particular key will provide 
within a given cryptographic system. See MATT BLAZE, WHITFIELD DIFFIE, RONALD L. 
RIVEST, BRUCE SCHNEIER, TSUTOMU SHIMOMURA, ERIC THOMPSON & MICHAEL WIENER, 
MINIMAL KEY LENGTHS FOR SYMMETRIC CIPHERS TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE COMMERCIAL 
SECURITY (1996), available at http://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/bsa-final-report.pdf. 
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protection of sensitive information through 2015.107 That is, a stored message 
encrypted using a properly implemented RSA cryptographic algorithm and a 
1024-bit key could safely be considered unbreakable—or at least computationally 
infeasible to break—through 2015. But in May 2007, a group of researchers used a 
networked array of four hundred computers to factor a 1039-bit number in eleven 
months.108 While the number the researchers factored was not a true RSA 
number,109 it was close enough that cryptographers warned users of the RSA 
cryptographic system not to use keys of size 1024-bit and smaller.110 Thus, even the 
most pessimistic of cryptographers, armed with years of empirical research, could 
not accurately predict a combination of improvements in research and computing 
power (along with the ever-present and completely unpredictable factor of human 
ingenuity) that would diminish the future viability of a key size by years.111 
The limited shelf life of cryptographic keys, and by extension the messages 
encrypted with those keys, becomes highly significant when we consider the 
implications of a secret NSA program to collect—and store indefinitely—all 
encrypted messages sent by U.S. citizens. Cryptography and mathematics 
researchers worldwide spend countless hours creating, analyzing, and attempting to 
break cryptographic systems, a time-honored and open process that serves as the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 107. J. SCHAAD, B. KALISKI & R. HOUSLEY, ADDITIONAL ALGORITHMS AND IDENTIFIERS 
FOR RSA CRYPTOGRAPHY FOR USE IN THE INTERNET X.509 PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE 
CERTIFICATE AND CERTIFICATE REVOCATION LIST (CRL) PROFILE, at 23, (2005), available at 
http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc4055.pdf. Key length is measured in bits, which is the most basic 
unit of information in computing, having only two possible values, 0 or 1. A 1024-bit RSA 
key is a very large number which has over three hundred decimal digits and which is the 
product of two smaller (but still quite large) prime numbers. As noted in Part I.C, supra, the 
security of the RSA cryptographic system, and others like it, depends on the computational 
infeasibility of factoring a very large number which is the product of two large prime 
numbers. Advances in techniques and computing power thus effectively erode a key’s 
cryptographic value over time. See M.J.B. ROBSHAW, SECURITY ESTIMATES FOR 512-BIT RSA 
(1995), available at http://www.networkdls.com/Articles/security_estimates.pdf. 
 108. See Jacqui Cheng, Researchers: 307-Digit Key Crack Endangers 1024-bit RSA, ARS 
TECHNICA (May 23, 2007, 6:37 PM), http://arstechnica.com/uncategorized/2007/05
/researchers-307-digit-key-crack-endangers-1024-bit-rsa/. 
 109. Beginning in 1991, RSA Laboratories published a series of large semiprime 
numbers—known as RSA numbers—as a challenge to researchers to find the two prime factors 
of each RSA number. See RSA Labs., The RSA Factoring Challenge FAQ, EMC2, 
http://www.emc.com/emc-plus/rsa-labs/historical/the-rsa-factoring-challenge-faq.htm; see also 
RSA Number, WOLFRAM MATHWORLD, http://mathworld.wolfram.com/RSANumber.html. 
Though it is no longer active, the RSA Factoring Challenge was meant to encourage 
cryptographic research, as well as to provide a “coal mine canary” to warn researchers when 
certain key sizes were no longer to be considered cryptographically safe. RSA Labs., supra. 
 110. See Cheng, supra note 108. 
 111. The list of unimaginably large semiprime numbers which have since been factored 
continues to grow. For example, a Mersenne Prime (prime numbers which take the form 
2p – 1, where p is prime) of size 21061 – 1, a number with 320 decimal digits, was factored 
between early 2011 and August 2012. See GREG CHILDERS, FACTORIZATION OF A 1061-BIT 
NUMBER BY THE SPECIAL NUMBER FIELD SIEVE (2012), available at http://eprint.iacr.org
/2012/444.pdf. 
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only acceptable proving (and disproving) grounds for strong cryptography.112 It is 
therefore not entirely surprising when cryptographic systems are broken, even those 
designed by recognized experts in the field and in use for years.113 This fact is not 
lost on the NSA, which employs thousands of mathematicians, many of whom hold 
PhDs in the field, to research ways to make and break cryptographic systems.114 By 
collecting and storing encrypted messages for indefinite periods of time, the NSA 
has asserted its own authority to eventually decrypt every such message, regardless 
of its origin or intent. 
In fact, the Snowden documents have shown that, over the past decade, the NSA 
has increased its efforts to find ways to break cryptographic systems.115 While 
some have interpreted these NSA documents to mean that the agency has “cracked 
much of the encryption” available on the web,116 most cryptography experts are of 
the opinion that, in most cases, the NSA is not attacking the cryptographic 
protocols themselves, since these still pose mathematically intractable problems, 
but is rather attacking weaknesses in their implementations.117 More disturbing to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 112. As described in Part I.C, supra, cryptography is an arcane and difficult discipline, 
and there is no known way to design, implement, and vet systems strong enough to 
withstand known attacks other than through continual research and testing by the 
cryptography research community. See FERGUSON ET AL., supra note 69, at 13. 
 113. See id. An example of a widely used and trusted cryptographic system later found to 
be fatally flawed is the MD5 message digest algorithm. MD5 is an example of a 
cryptographic hash function, which takes an arbitrary block of data and returns a fixed-size 
string (a cryptographic hash value) with the following properties: (1) it is easy to compute 
the hash value from any given message, (2) it is infeasible to generate a message that has a 
given hash value, (3) it is infeasible to modify a message without changing the resulting hash 
value, and (4) it is infeasible to find two different messages with the same hash value. See 
SCHNEIER, supra note 69, at 429–36. MD5 was designed by Ron Rivest (the “R” in RSA) in 
1992 to replace the flawed MD4. See R. Rivest, The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm, 
IETF.ORG (April 1992), http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1321.txt. In 1996, however, a flaw in 
MD5 was discovered by researchers who demonstrated that MD5 failed property (4) above. 
See XIAOYUN WANG & HONGBU YU, HOW TO BREAK MD5 AND OTHER HASH FUNCTIONS, 
available at http://merlot.usc.edu/csac-f06/papers/Wang05a.pdf. MD5 has since been 
considered unsuitable for strong cryptographic applications. See Marc Stevens, Arjen K. 
Lenstra & Benne de Weger, Vulnerability of Software Integrity and Code Signing 
Applications to Chosen-Prefix Collisions for MD5, EINDHOVEN U. TECH. (Jan. 1, 2009), 
http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/SoftIntCodeSign/. 
 114. See Critical Skills for National Security and the Homeland Security Federal 
Workforce Act: Hearing on S. 1800 Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Sec., Proliferation & Fed. 
Servs. of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. 11 (2002) (statement of 
Harvey A. Davis, Associate Director, Human Resources Services, National Security 
Agency); see also Siobhan Gorman, Intelligence Chiefs: Shutdown Threatening National 
Security, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 2, 2013, 12:33 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2013/10/02
/intelligence-chiefs-shutdown-threatening-national-security/. 
 115. See Perlroth et al., supra note 71. 
 116. Id. 
 117. See, e.g., Bruce Schneier, NSA Surveillance: A Guide to Staying Secure, GUARDIAN, 
(Sept. 6, 2013, 9:09 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-how-to-remain
-secure-surveillance. Cryptographers are well aware of the “weakest link property,” which can 
be summarized by the principle that a cryptographic system is only as strong as its weakest 
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the cryptographic community, however, is the discovery of NSA manipulation of 
cryptographic standards and commercial cryptographic systems in order to provide 
“back doors” to easily decrypt messages without the proper key.118 These 
manipulations not only weaken defenses against malicious Internet activities but 
also directly threaten the trust that must exist between a government and its 
citizens. This trust is a constitutional value even more fundamental to Fourth 
Amendment principles than is privacy, and it should be a guide to the Fourth 
Amendment analysis of the NSA’s broad collection of encrypted messages.119 
II. PRIVACY, POWER, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR PERFECT SECURITY 
A. The Development of Current Fourth Amendment Doctrine 
The lineage of today’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence can be traced directly 
back to the Supreme Court’s decision in Olmstead v. United States.120 In Olmstead, 
the Court considered whether the warrantless wiretapping of a telephone line 
violated the Fourth Amendment.121 The majority held that the defendants’ Fourth 
Amendment rights were not violated by this warrantless wiretapping, stating that 
“[t]he [Fourth] Amendment . . . shows that the search is to be of material things—
the person, the house, his papers or his effects.”122 Since government wiretapping 
                                                                                                                 
link. See FERGUSON ET AL., supra note 69, at 3–5. Simply put, the strongest cryptographic 
protocols are worthless if the system implementing the protocols provides opportunities to read 
secret messages without actually finding a mathematical shortcut to decryption. 
 118. In addition to “partnerships with major telecommunications carriers to shape the 
global network to benefit other collection accesses,” the NSA has been “‘actively engag[ing] 
the U.S. and foreign IT industries to covertly influence and/or overtly leverage their 
commercial products’ designs’ to make them ‘exploitable.’” Perlroth, supra note 71. In other 
words, the NSA has been working with technology companies to provide hidden back doors 
by “insert[ing] vulnerabilities into commercial encryption systems, IT systems, networks, 
and endpoint communications devices used by targets.” See Secret Documents Reveal N.S.A. 
Campaign Against Encryption, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com
/interactive/2013/09/05/us/documents-reveal-nsa-campaign-against-encryption.html. 
Cryptographers, mathematical researchers, and other scientists have been especially 
alarmed by the NSA’s efforts to “[i]nfluence policies, standards and specifications for 
commercial public key technologies.” Perlroth, supra note 71. Mathematicians have recently 
confirmed that an important cryptographic standard published by NIST was artificially 
weakened through secret NSA manipulation. See Green, Many Flaws, supra note 71. This has 
been a suspected flaw since mathematicians aired their suspicions in 2007. See Bruce Schneier, 
Did NSA Put a Secret Backdoor in New Encryption Standard?, WIRED, (Nov. 15, 2007), 
http://archive.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2007/11/securitymatters
_1115. Researchers and commercial entities rely on standards bodies to provide unbiased 
advice as to which cryptographic protocols and algorithms will provide the most robust 
protection. To subvert or corrupt this process quickly dissolves the trust relationships necessary 
for a democratic and free market society to thrive, and we have already begun to see its effects. 
See Goodin, supra note 71. I will explore this issue in more detail in Part II, infra. 
 119. See infra Part IV. 
 120. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 121. Id. at 455. 
 122. Id. at 464. 
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required neither “physical invasion” nor the seizure of “tangible material effects,” it 
was not a search under the Fourth Amendment.123 
It was Justice Brandeis’s famous dissent in Olmstead, however, that set the stage 
for the Court’s later Fourth Amendment doctrine. Justice Brandeis criticized the 
majority’s narrow, property-based interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, 
warning of the effects that advances in technology would have under this 
doctrine.124 In particular, he stated that “general limitations on the powers of 
Government . . . do not forbid the United States or the States from meeting modern 
conditions by regulations which ‘a century ago, or even half century ago, probably 
would have been rejected as arbitrary or oppressive.’”125 
The criticisms Justice Brandeis laid out in his dissent placed a Fourth 
Amendment emphasis on protecting citizens’ privacy from unwarranted 
government intrusion, noting that the Founders “knew that only a part of the pain, 
pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things” and that “[t]o 
protect [Fourth Amendment rights], every unjustifiable intrusion by the 
Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, 
must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.”126 His dissent in Olmstead 
continues to influence the Court even today.127 
By the 1960s, the Court began to move away from the property-based, trespass 
theory of the Fourth Amendment found in Olmstead, leading to its complete 
rejection in Katz v. United States.128 In Katz, government agents installed a 
microphone in a telephone booth knowing the defendant used it to discuss illegal 
gambling operations.129 The Court addressed the question of whether the evidence 
gathered by the agents in their warrantless eavesdropping had been obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.130 The Katz Court rejected the property-based 
approach of Olmstead, stating that property and trespass did not control the 
government’s ability to conduct Fourth Amendment searches.131 
The rejection of the Fourth Amendment doctrine articulated in Olmstead 
provided the Katz Court with the foundation upon which it created what is now 
known as the “reasonable expectation of privacy test.”132 This test has its origins in 
Justice Harlan’s concurrence, where he stated that his “understanding of the rule 
that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement [for a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 123. Id. at 466. 
 124. See Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General 
Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1024 (2010). 
 125. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 472 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (quoting Village of Euclid v. 
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926)). 
 126. Id. at 478. 
 127. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 959 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (citing Justice Brandeis’s Olmstead dissent in her criticism of a property-based 
Fourth Amendment doctrine); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961) (citing Justice 
Brandeis’s Olmstead dissent to support application of the exclusionary rule to the states). 
 128. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 129. Id. at 348. 
 130. Id. at 348−50. 
 131. Id. at 353. 
 132. See infra note 134 and accompanying text. 
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Fourth Amendment search], first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is 
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”133 
B. The Twin Problems of Reasonableness and Perspective 
in Fourth Amendment Analysis 
Modern Fourth Amendment doctrine is a direct result of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Katz and the Court’s first articulation of a “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” test for Fourth Amendment protection.134 The majority in Katz declared 
that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,”135 and along with Justice 
Harlan’s concurring opinion, established a privacy-based analysis for searches 
within the amendment.136 By introducing the concept of privacy into its Fourth 
Amendment analysis, the Court, perhaps inadvertently, opened the door for later 
courts to redefine Fourth Amendment protections by using the concept to decide 
whether a government intrusion was reasonable under the amendment. 
What ultimately became a reasonableness-balancing test arose out of the Court’s 
decisions in Camara v. Municipal Court137 and Terry v. Ohio.138 The jurisprudence 
that emerged from these cases balanced an individual’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy against the needs or interest of the government.139 This balancing test 
created a sort of reasonableness ratio, where warrants were ultimately evaluated 
based on the weight of the government’s need for the intrusion, and opened the 
door for a smorgasbord of government intrusions that lacked any sort of 
individualized probable cause under traditional Fourth Amendment analysis but 
which the Court could find “reasonable” in the balance. The doctrinal deck has 
been stacked: how can mere privacy compete with the fundamental importance of 
the fight against global terrorism, the War on Drugs, or our children’s safety? 
Post-Katz opinions are replete with the Court’s recognition of the “special 
needs” of the government, which thus outweigh the individual’s argument under 
                                                                                                                 
 
 133. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 134. While the phrase “reasonable expectation of privacy” only appeared in Justice 
Harlan’s concurring opinion in Katz, id. at 360, it has since become the standard description 
of the Katz test. Id. (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman’s” Fourth 
Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1751, 1756 (1994). 
 135. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (majority opinion). 
 136. Smith v. Maryland , 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (“Consistently with Katz, this Court 
uniformly has held that the application of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the 
person invoking its protection can claim a justifiable, a reasonable, or a legitimate 
expectation of privacy that has been invaded by a government action.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). For an excellent discussion of Fourth Amendment doctrine post-Katz, see 
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349 (1974). 
 137. 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (applying Fourth Amendment doctrine to housing inspections based 
on balancing the needs of government against the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy). 
 138. 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (applying Fourth Amendment doctrine to police “stop-and-frisk” 
procedures based on reasonable suspicion that the individual was armed). 
 139. See Sundby, supra note 134, at 1769–70; cf. Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment 
Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 487–89 (2011). 
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the balancing test.140 This special needs doctrine grew out of the Supreme Court’s 
recognition of the unique issues arising from administrative searches and the 
Court’s attempts to carve out exceptions to traditional Fourth Amendment 
requirements for these civil searches.141 Prior to the Court’s decision in Camara, 
administrative and civil searches were not subject to Fourth Amendment 
requirements.142 In Camara, however, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment’s 
warrant clause should also apply to administrative searches, albeit in a somewhat 
more limited context.143 
The Court more fully articulated what is now known as the “special needs” 
doctrine in New Jersey v. T.L.O., where a high school administrator searched a 
purse belonging to a student he suspected of smoking in the school.144 The school 
administrator had neither a warrant nor probable cause to conduct the search, but 
the Court allowed it based on two factors: first, the administrator’s search was 
conducted for the purpose of “maintaining discipline in the classroom and on 
school grounds” and not for the purpose of law enforcement;145 second, high school 
students have a “lesser expectation of privacy” than citizens in general.146 Justice 
Blackmun’s concurrence in the judgment laid out a test wherein the special needs 
doctrine was permitted “[o]nly in those exceptional circumstances in which special 
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and 
probable-cause requirement impracticable.”147 
The “War on Terror” that followed the catastrophic events of September 11, 2001, 
increased the frequency of suspicionless searches by law enforcement, including 
contexts such as searches at entrances to subways, on ferries, near political 
conventions, near sports arenas, at protest rallies, and around water reservoirs.148 
In particular, the genuine problem of global terrorism and the government’s duty 
to provide for national security have added even more momentum to the courts’ 
consistent trend toward analyzing Fourth Amendment problems from the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 140. See, e.g., Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989) 
(“[Illegal drugs are] one of the greatest problems affecting the health and welfare of our 
population.”); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n., 489 U.S. 602, 607 (1989) (observing 
fatalities, injuries, and damages from train accidents where alcohol or drugs were the cause); 
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985) (“Maintaining order in the classroom has 
never been easy, but in recent years, school disorder has often taken particularly ugly forms: 
drug use and violent crime in the schools have become major social problems.”). 
 141. See, e.g., Camara, 387 U.S. at 530 (administrative searches related to health and 
public safety, such as enforcement of housing codes, often require suspicionless searches not 
easily conducted under traditional Fourth Amendment requirements). 
 142. See id. 
 143. Id. at 534. The Court recognized that although the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment applied to administrative searches, the requirement was met without having to 
reach the level of probable cause required for searches relating to criminal matters. 
 144. 469 U.S. at 328; see also Ric Simmons, Searching for Terrorists: Why Public Safety 
Is Not a Special Need, 59 DUKE L.J. 843, 863–65 (2010). 
 145. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339. 
 146. Id. at 348 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 147. Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 148. See Simmons, supra note 144, at 873−84. 
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government’s point of view.149 This is not to say that courts routinely adopt the 
government’s arguments in Fourth Amendment cases, but rather that over the past 
three decades, the Supreme Court has been formulating Fourth Amendment doctrine 
from the perspective of the government or police agency engaged in searches or 
seizures.150 This is contrary to the Court’s orientation toward the individual in Katz 
and turns Fourth Amendment doctrine on its head; the Fourth Amendment was 
designed to protect citizens from unjustified and arbitrary government intrusions, not 
to facilitate the government’s needs.151 This core constitutional tenet is especially 
important when addressing government collective-surveillance programs in the face 
of government claims of national security necessity. 
Current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has been steadily moving toward 
analysis that begins from the government’s perspective, a trend made plain in 
post-Katz cases that complain of the burden placed on government by Fourth 
Amendment requirements.152 This doctrinal trend has been even more prevalent in 
cases argued after September 11, 2001, where the government argues that the needs 
of national security require an even freer hand unencumbered by naïve Fourth 
Amendment analysis made quaint by the global war on terrorism.153 
In Amnesty International USA v. Clapper, for example, the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals denied en banc review of an earlier decision by the court granting 
standing to plaintiffs who brought claims of Fourth Amendment violations by the 
government. In its decision, the Clapper court accepted, without challenge, the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 149. See Sundby, supra note 134, at 1796−97. 
 150. See id. at 1788−90. 
 151. Justice Brandeis stated that when deciding Fourth Amendment questions, it is 
“immaterial that the [challenged] intrusion was in aid of law enforcement.” Olmstead v. 
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled in part by Katz 
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); see also Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio 
and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in 
Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1393 (1983). 
 152. See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 876 (1987) (observing that requiring 
probation officers to obtain a warrant before conducting an unrestricted search of a 
probationer’s home would “make it more difficult for probation officials to respond quickly 
to evidence of misconduct” and would “reduce the deterrent effect that the possibility of 
expeditious searches would otherwise create”); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 
(1984) (protesting “the substantial social costs exacted by the exclusionary rule for the 
vindication of Fourth Amendment rights”); Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 603 (2d 
Cir. 1999) (“[T]here are some [government] agencies outside the realm of criminal law 
enforcement where government officials have special needs beyond the normal need for law 
enforcement,” and forcing these agencies “to follow ordinary law-enforcement requirements 
under the Fourth Amendment would impose intolerable burdens . . . .” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); Willner v. Thornburgh, 928 F.2d 1185, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“[W]hen the 
burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the 
search, the Fourth Amendment does not require a warrant.” (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 153. See, e.g., Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 667 F.3d 163, 172 (2d Cir. 2011) (Lynch, 
J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc). In 2013, the United States Supreme Court 
reversed the Second Circuit’s earlier decision, finding that plaintiffs lacked Article III 
standing. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143 (2013). 
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government’s contention that the surveillance programs in question were “fully 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment,” and stated in its reasoning that “[i]t is 
important to remember what is at stake here . . . because the paramount necessity of 
protecting the nation’s security against very real and dangerous external threats 
requires the limited additional burden on a discrete category of international 
communications imposed by the statute.”154 This general philosophy had been 
strongly encouraged by the government, as evidenced by the December 2005 
revelation of a secret NSA program to intercept electronic communications 
between the United States and foreign countries without warrants or probable 
cause.155 The Bush administration acknowledged and defended this warrantless 
wiretapping, with the Department of Justice suggesting that there may be other 
warrantless eavesdropping beyond what had already been disclosed.156 
But this analytical perspective runs counter to the individualistic, 
protection-oriented jurisprudence of Katz, replacing it with a 
government-needs-and-interests-based analysis. This has led to an astigmatic view 
of the Fourth Amendment’s purpose. An important inflection point in this 
post-Katz Fourth Amendment jurisprudence can be found in Terry, which initiated 
the Court’s police perspective and introduced a new doctrine of stop and frisk.157 
C. Parallels with Stop-and-Frisk Policies 
The NSA’s asserted right to collect and keep indefinitely all encrypted 
communications from U.S. citizens without a warrant, court order, or any 
particularized suspicion, bears some resemblance to the reasoning used to justify 
suspicionless stop-and-frisk policies. That is, supporters of the proactive police tool 
of stop and frisk based on Terry and its progeny argue that the tool’s effectiveness 
at preventing crime is justification enough.158 Stop-and-frisk proponents defend the 
program even when it is shown that these stops result in a very low number of 
actual arrests or discovery of contraband and often result in abusive police practices 
that target certain groups irrespective of a lack of individualized suspicion.159 
Through its collective-surveillance program of seizing and storing every encrypted 
communication from any U.S. citizen, irrespective of a lack of probable cause or 
                                                                                                                 
 
 154. Amnesty Int’l USA, 667 F.3d at 172. 
 155. See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1. 
 156. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE 
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT 5 (2006), available at 
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 157. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 158. See, e.g., David Rudovsky & Lawrence Rosenthal, Debate, The Constitutionality of 
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http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/162-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-117.pdf. 
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reasonable suspicion, the NSA is similarly arguing that any improvement in national 
security—no matter how miniscule—justifies these collective warrantless seizures.160 
The use of stop-and-frisk policies by police departments has been found 
constitutionally reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.161 In these searches, 
police “stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has 
a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be 
afoot,’ even if the officer lacks probable cause.”162 That is, a police officer may 
conduct a stop and frisk “when the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that 
the person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.”163 At a 
minimum, “[t]he officer [making the stop] . . . must be able to articulate something 
more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.’”164 Reasonable 
suspicion therefore requires an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.165 While 
the Supreme Court has recognized certain narrow exceptions to this Fourth 
Amendment requirement, the Court has made no such exception for stops and 
frisks for the general purpose of controlling crime.166 
In its examination of the stop-and-frisk practices of the NYPD, the Floyd court 
discussed the police officers’ vague justifications for these stops, among the most 
common of which was a person’s “furtive movements.”167 The court stated that if 
police officers truly believed that this broad description justifies a stop and frisk, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 160. I do not argue that the NSA’s collective-surveillance programs and domestic police 
stop-and-frisk policies are perfectly analogous. For example, as illustrated in Floyd, New 
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 161. See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 30–31. 
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440 U.S. 648, 659 n.18 (1979))). 
 167. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). One officer 
explained his understanding of “furtive movement” as “a very broad concept” that could 
include a person 
“changing direction,” “walking in a certain way,” “[a]cting a little suspicious,” 
“making a movement that is not regular,” being “very fidgety,” “going in and 
out of his pocket,” “going in and out of a location,” “looking back and forth 
constantly,” “looking over their shoulder,” “adjusting their hip or their belt,” 
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Id. (emphasis in original). Under these broad conditions, it appears as if almost any 
ordinary activity could be construed as “furtive movement” by the police. 
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“then it is no surprise that stops so rarely produce evidence of criminal activity.”168 
The court held that the NYPD violated the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights 
under these conditions, stating that “‘[t]he idea of universal suspicion without 
individual evidence is what Americans find abhorrent . . . .’”169 
A thought experiment is appropriate here. If a program like stop and frisk is 
effective in fighting crime—as the City of New York claimed in Floyd—what if, 
on this basis alone, the program was not only allowed to continue but expanded to 
require suspicionless stops of all citizens, regardless of other circumstances?170 The 
Floyd court addressed this point, stating that “[m]any police practices may be 
useful for fighting crime—preventive detention or coerced confessions, for 
example—but because they are unconstitutional they cannot be used, no matter 
how effective. ‘The enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes certain 
policy choices off the table.’”171 
But constitutionality only addresses a part (albeit an important one) of the 
underlying issues. If the City of New York wanted to ensure the complete 
effectiveness of its program, it would need to stop, frisk, or question every single 
person walking or driving the streets of New York. This is impossible, of course, 
since the numbers required to implement such a universal program are beyond even 
the NYPD’s current strength.172 Moreover, such a program would introduce an 
unacceptable drag on the ordinary business and functions within the city. Finally, 
such a universal program would likely have the opposite effect from that intended, 
as the increasing friction between the police and those being searched would 
ultimately erode order.173 The NYPD tacitly conceded these points in Floyd, when 
a police deputy inspector explained that “stopping ‘the right people, [at] the right 
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time, [in] the right location’ meant not stopping ‘a 48-year-old lady [who] was 
walking through St. Mary’s Park when it was closed.’”174 
These real world constraints provide a natural brake on police search-and-seizure 
abuses that do not necessarily need a court opinion to have an effect. What happens, 
however, when technology presents methods of conducting a similar form of 
collective, persistent surveillance that avoids these natural constraints? This is the 
case that these newly confirmed government surveillance programs have put before 
us today, and it is in these cases, where the natural safety nets of limited resources 
and public opinion are missing, that constitutional diligence must be at its strongest. 
D. The Double-Edged Sword of Technology 
The steady advance of communication technology since the nineteenth century 
has effectively brought nearly everyone on the planet within earshot of one 
another.175 Within a mere two centuries, messages intended for transoceanic 
recipients, which would have taken many weeks to reach their destination, can 
reach their recipient within a fraction of a second.176 Furthermore, modern modes 
of communication are not just available to governments or large commercial 
enterprises but to anyone with a cell phone.177 The result has been a virtual 
shrinking of our planet and has spurred a flood of global communication and media 
that existed solely in the realm of speculative fiction only a few decades ago.178 
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RATES), available at http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Documents/statistics/2013/ITU
_Key_2005-2013_ICT_data.xls. 
 178. The myriad ways we have integrated computing and the Internet into our daily lives 
have brought us to a point where many tasks that would have been seen as miraculous just a 
few years ago—such as high-quality audio and video on mobile devices, international video 
conferencing via cell phones, and widespread GPS—have become mundane and therefore 
transparent. In fact, the ability to put fully functional computers in the tiniest devices is 
creating what scholars have referred to as the Internet of Things—the equipping of nearly 
every device with computing and networking functionality, thus enabling transformative 
uses of new and existing technologies. Cf. Kevin Ashton, That ‘Internet of Things’ Thing, 
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These advances have brought with them new and unforeseen opportunities for 
governments to implement broad, persistent surveillance programs.179 Courts have 
slowly begun to realize the impact these technologies may have on existing Fourth 
Amendment doctrine and have started to question the application of existing 
jurisprudence to “contemporary forms of communication.”180 Commentators have 
debated the usefulness of existing Fourth Amendment norms when considering 
new technologies for some time, with mixed results.181 
Government use of advances in information technologies to collect and analyze 
ever larger and more detailed citizen databases should come as no surprise. 
Questions of efficacy aside for the moment, the State’s increased use of data 
collection and analysis is a predictable result of the continued realization of 
Moore’s Law.182 Furthermore, this growth is not a new phenomenon. Governments 
used data collection and analysis long before the post-2001 counterterrorism efforts 
to accomplish such well-established goals as crime prevention, delivery of welfare 
benefits, and protection of citizens’ rights.183 
                                                                                                                 
RFID J. (June 22, 2009), http://www.rfidjournal.com/articles/view?4986. 
 179. See, e.g., In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of 
Historical Cell-Site Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d 113 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (denying the government’s 
application for cell-site-location records, observing that the use of GPS data sent by cell 
phones could allow for total geographical surveillance by the government); State v. Patino, 
No. P1-10-1155A, 2012 R.I. Super. LEXIS 139 (Sept. 4, 2012) (explaining that 
contemporary forms of communication, such as text messages, could provide easily 
obtainable information to government agencies and are protected under the Fourth 
Amendment), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 93 A.3d 40 (R.I. 2014); Courtney M. 
Bowman, A Way Forward After Warshak: Fourth Amendment Protections for E-mail, 27 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 809, 815–18 (2012) (describing e-mail technology and protocols and 
the information leaked through third-party doctrine); Kerr, supra note 124, at 1012 
(discussing Internet communications transmitted over wireless networks that are therefore 
vulnerable to eavesdropping); see also supra Introduction (discussing formerly secret NSA 
surveillance programs). 
 180. Patino, 2012 R.I. Super. LEXIS 139, at *128 (“[T]he third-party doctrine [under 
Fourth Amendment analysis] is ill-suited for contemporary forms of communication and 
thus should not wholly defeat an individual’s expectation of privacy in the contents of his or 
her text messages.”). 
 181. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths 
and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801 (2004) (debating the role courts should take 
when considering Fourth Amendment issues arising out of new technologies and their uses). 
 182. Cf. James X. Dempsey & Lara M. Flint, Commercial Data and National Security, 
72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1459, 1459–64 (2004). 
 183. The two-edged sword of technological advances leading to increased data collection 
is not solely a means for social control. Rather, information may be used by governments to 
protect citizens’ rights and provide for their welfare: 
[T]he surveillance systems of advanced bureaucratic nation-states are not so 
much the repressive machines that pessimists imply, but the outcome of 
aspirations and strivings for citizenship. If government departments are to treat 
people equally . . . then those people must be individually identified. To 
exercise the right to vote, one’s name must appear on the electoral roll; to claim 
welfare benefits, personal details must be documented. Thus . . . the 
individuation that treats people in their own right, rather than merely as 
members of families or communities, means freedom from specific constraints 
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The government, therefore, has many compelling reasons to collect and store 
information about its citizens, and the increasing ease with which we communicate 
over the Internet has made it a natural tool for information gathering.184 With the 
ability to collect and store virtually all information communicated over the Internet, 
the government could apply analytical tools to reveal a very detailed portrait of 
who we are based on what we buy, what organizations we belong to, what we read, 
and what we watch.185 
The base analytical tools made available under existing Fourth Amendment 
doctrine are sound but have been gradually (and artificially) limited to a 
characterization of the underlying constitutional issues that have little basis in the 
Framers’ intent. This characterization, focusing on an ill-defined concept of privacy 
and taken from the perspective of the government agent engaged in search and 
seizure, has been redefined from a prohibition against impermissible government 
intrusions based firmly on the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause186 to a 
balancing test which weighs an individual’s right to privacy against the government 
interest in effective law enforcement. This balancing test departs from the language 
of the Warrant Clause and relies instead on the Reasonableness Clause, based on 
the special needs of government.187 
                                                                                                                 
but also greater opportunities for surveillance and control on the part of a 
centralized state. 
DAVID LYON, THE ELECTRONIC EYE: THE RISE OF SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY 32–33 (1994) 
(internal quotations omitted). A very early example of government use of citizens’ data to 
facilitate governance can be found in the Domesday Book, commissioned in 1086 by 
William the Conqueror, which included exhaustive compilations of landholders, tenants, 
properties, and their values. This early administrative record keeping established four 
characteristics of the surveillance state which survive today: (1) political power was the 
essential personage; (2) power was exercised first of all by posing questions, by 
interrogating; (3) in order to determine the truth, power appealed to notables to give this 
information; and (4) the king consulted the notables without forcing them to tell the truth 
through the use of violence, pressure, or torture. Foucault, supra note 24, at 45. 
 184. As Lawrence Lessig once observed, “[C]yberspace does not guarantee its own 
freedom but instead carries an extraordinary potential for control.” LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 
AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 58 (1999). 
 185. See Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the 
Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1138–39 (2002). 
 186. The protections laid out by the Fourth Amendment are principally found in two 
clauses: the Warrant Clause, which requires that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause,” and the Reasonableness Clause, whose somewhat vague language prohibits 
“unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 187. See supra Part II.B. But see Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415 (2013) 
(applying trespass analogy when considering whether a drug search by a dog on a home’s 
front porch is a search under the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 
949 (2012) (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)) (observing the Fourth 
Amendment’s “close connection to property” and raising the common-law trespass theory of 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). It remains to be seen whether Jones and its progeny will 
yield a new paradigm of Fourth Amendment analysis which relies once again on common-law 
trespass as a partial basis. Courts appear skeptical of any significant change in the doctrine. 
See United States v. McGuire, No. CR 13-40058, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145175, at *25–31 
(D.S.D. Oct. 1, 2013) (questioning the trespass analyses in Jones and Jardines), magistrate 
report adopted by 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174657 (D.S.D. Dec. 10, 2013). 
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E. Privacy, Secrecy, Security, and Their Measure 
One of the more problematic components of the Fourth Amendment “balancing 
test” is its dependence on the elusive concept of privacy and its assumed inherent 
quantifiability.188 The difficulty with this approach lies both in its implied 
conflation of a multitude of privacy definitions and in its use as a “fact” rather than 
as a value by the courts.189 While courts appear to agree wholeheartedly in the 
abstract concept of privacy as a cherished constitutional value,190 it is not the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 188. See, e.g., Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1970 (2013) (“‘[R]ather than 
employing a per se rule of unreasonableness, we balance the privacy-related and law 
enforcement-related concerns to determine if the intrusion was reasonable.” (emphasis in 
original) (quoting Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331 (2001))); Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 
536 U.S. 822, 829 (2002) (“[W]e generally determine the reasonableness of a search by 
balancing the nature of the intrusion on the individual’s privacy against the promotion of 
legitimate governmental interests.”); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121 (2001) 
(“Although the Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires the degree of probability embodied in 
the term ‘probable cause,’ a lesser degree satisfies the Constitution when the balance of 
governmental and private interests makes such a standard reasonable.”); United States v. 
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 125 (1984) (“To assess the reasonableness of this [search], ‘[w]e 
must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment 
interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the 
intrusion.’” (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983))); Delaware v. Prouse, 
440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) (“[T]he permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is 
judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its 
promotion of legitimate government interests.”). 
 189. Privacy violations can involve a wide variety of harmful or problematic activities. 
Daniel Solove lists examples such as newspapers naming rape victims, reporters gaining 
entry to a person’s home under false pretenses to photograph her, the use of backscatter 
X-ray machines—colloquially known as “virtual strip-search machines” for their ability to 
see through clothing—by the U.S. Transportation Security Agency, the government use of 
thermal sensors to detect heat emanating from private homes, a company marketing a list of 
millions of elderly incontinent women, and a company selling personal information of 
customers despite promises not to do so. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 6 
(2008). It is plain that all of these patterns are examples of one sort of privacy violation or 
another, but they exhibit very different actors and situations. To lump all such examples 
under a single concept of privacy either fails to properly recognize the problem or unfairly 
conflates these problems to fit a desired rubric. 
 190. Courts will often speak in reverent tones about the core constitutional importance of 
an individual’s privacy, and then follow this homage to the abstract concept with an 
explanation why a particular government search was therefore permissible. See, e.g., Skinner 
v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 613–16 (1989) (stating that “[t]he [Fourth] 
Amendment guarantees the privacy, dignity, and security of persons against certain arbitrary 
and invasive acts by officers of the Government or those acting at their discretion,” and the 
“physical intrusion” of a blood test “penetrating beneath the skin, infringes an expectation of 
privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable,” yet finding that mandatory 
government blood and urine tests were reasonable); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335 
(1985) (noting that “‘[t]he basic purpose of [the Fourth] Amendment, as recognized in 
countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals 
against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials,’” and “the individual’s interest in 
privacy and personal security ‘suffers whether the government’s motivation is to investigate 
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principle of privacy but its factual nature that has driven recent decisions.191 Any 
Fourth Amendment analysis that treats privacy as merely a factual matter to be 
quantified and weighed against the concerns of the government unnecessarily 
complicates Fourth Amendment analysis and ignores the much more fundamental 
principle first articulated by Justice Brandeis—“the right to be let alone.”192 This 
problem becomes especially acute when courts attempt to reconcile the balancing 
approach to Fourth Amendment analysis with technological advances that give the 
government the ability to invade an individual’s privacy with relatively little (or 
no) perceived physical intrusion.193 
This shift to a factual analysis and quantification of privacy has not only 
drawn the courts’ attention away from the consideration of the fundamental value 
of privacy but has also led to some rather strange, fact-specific discussions 
involving such topics as garbage left on the curb for collection,194 thermal 
                                                                                                                 
violations of criminal laws or breaches of other statutory or regulatory standards,’” before 
holding that a public school teacher’s warrantless search of a student’s purse was reasonable 
(alteration in original) (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967); 
Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312–13 (1978))); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 
(1968) (observing that a police frisk was a “serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, 
which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment,” but holding that such a frisk 
was permissible under less than probable cause); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 
(1966) (upholding a mandatory blood test while noting that “[t]he integrity of an individual’s 
person is a cherished value of our society”). 
 191. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). In Smith, the Court considered 
privacy as a fact and held that no reasonable expectation of privacy exists in telephone 
numbers dialed, since 
[t]elephone users, in sum, typically know that they must convey numerical 
information to the phone company; that the phone company has facilities for 
recording this information; and that the phone company does in fact record this 
information for a variety of legitimate business purposes. Although subjective 
expectations cannot be scientifically gauged, it is too much to believe that 
telephone subscribers, under these circumstances, harbor any general 
expectation that the numbers they dial will remain secret. 
Id. at 743. Justice Marshall dissented, observing that privacy was a value independent of the 
underlying facts, since “whether privacy expectations are legitimate . . . depends not on the 
risks an individual can be presumed to accept when imparting information to third parties, 
but on the risks he should be forced to assume in a free and open society.” Id. at 750 
(Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 192. “The makers of our Constitution . . . conferred, as against the Government, the right 
to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized 
men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy 
of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.” Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting), overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 193. When technological advances give government agents the ability to invade an 
individual’s privacy without the need for an actual physical intrusion, courts tend to use a 
technologically enabled lesser intrusion as part of the justification for a government search 
that otherwise would not be allowed. See Sundby, supra note 134, at 1762–63 (discussing 
the courts’ use of a sliding scale of intrusion minimization to compensate for weaker 
government justifications for a search). 
 194. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (whether an individual has a privacy 
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imaging devices,195 hovering helicopters,196 dogs sniffing near homes,197 dogs 
sniffing near cars,198 the legal status of motor homes as actual homes,199 DNA 
collection,200 conversations in private driveways,201 and cell phone location 
information.202 To put it another way, under current Fourth Amendment doctrine, 
courts are not asking whether items, activities, or places should be kept private 
according to a set of fundamental values, but whether, under the facts of each case, 
we would expect others to be able to observe these items, activities, or places.203 
This doctrine runs counter to the Framers’ Fourth Amendment intent. Justice 
Brandeis’s famous dissent in Olmstead was the Court’s first pure articulation of the 
need to rely on the values and principles underlying the Constitution when 
interpreting Fourth Amendment protections.204 This is what Justice Brandeis meant: 
                                                                                                                 
interest in garbage left on the curb for collection). 
 195. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (whether a subjective expectation of 
privacy exists against police use of a thermal imaging scanner to detect heat patterns 
emanating from a private home). 
 196. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (whether an individual has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy from a helicopter flying four hundred feet above a home). 
 197. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013) (whether a reasonable expectation of 
privacy exists against a drug-sniffing dog being brought onto a porch). 
 198. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (whether a reasonable expectation of 
privacy exists against a drug-sniffing dog brought alongside a car stopped for speeding). 
 199. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985) (whether a motor home is more like a car 
or a home with respect to privacy expectations). 
 200. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013) (whether a postarrest—but 
preconviction—collection of DNA via a cheek swab was a violation of a reasonable 
expectation of privacy). 
 201. United States v. Scott, 731 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 2013) (whether an individual has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in conversations that take place in his driveway), cert. 
denied, 134 S. Ct. 1806 (2014). 
 202. United States v. Caraballo, 963 F. Supp. 2d 341 (D. Vt. 2013) (whether an individual 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in real-time cell phone location information). 
 203. Furthermore, the government may not avoid Fourth Amendment protections of 
private papers and communications merely by announcing that citizens should no longer 
have an expectation of privacy in these items. For example, in Smith v. Maryland, the 
Supreme Court stated that 
if the Government were suddenly to announce on nationwide television that all 
homes henceforth would be subject to warrantless entry, individuals thereafter 
might not in fact entertain any actual expectation of privacy regarding their 
homes, papers, and effects. Similarly, if a refugee from a totalitarian country, 
unaware of this Nation’s traditions, erroneously assumed that police were 
continuously monitoring his telephone conversations, a subjective expectation 
of privacy regarding the contents of his calls might be lacking as well. In such 
circumstances, where an individual’s subjective expectations had been 
“conditioned” by influences alien to well-recognized Fourth Amendment 
freedoms, those subjective expectations obviously could play no meaningful 
role in ascertaining what the scope of Fourth Amendment protection was. 
442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979). Note that, in light of revelations of government surveillance of 
U.S. citizens’ telephone, e-mail, and other electronic information, Justice Blackmun’s words 
take on a special—if unintended—meaning. 
 204. See supra note 192. 
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certain items should be free from government intrusion via the individual’s “right 
to be let alone.”205 This tenet is a far cry from the case-by-case factual privacy 
analysis currently employed in Fourth Amendment cases. But while broad 
principles such as this may work well in theory—we think we know a privacy 
violation when we see it—they are often too abstract to provide courts with 
predictable rules. 
In the years since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. government has 
exacerbated these issues by adopting an overall doctrine that has prioritized 
security above all else, creating what some scholars have called a “constitutional 
pathological period” with respect to national security.206 Of course, one of the 
government’s primary constitutional duties to its citizens is the maintenance of 
national security, and protecting the population from terrorist attacks certainly falls 
under this umbrella.207 Some scholars and commentators have argued that the need 
for national security in the age of terrorism either allows suspicionless searches 
under current Fourth Amendment doctrine or entirely supersedes any need for 
“traditional” Fourth Amendment analysis.208 National security is an important 
                                                                                                                 
 
 205. See supra Part II.A. 
 206. See Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 
COLUM. L. REV. 449, 459 (1985); Howard M. Wasserman, Constitutional Pathology, the 
War on Terror, and United States v. Klein, 5 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 211, 215–16 
(2011). Professors Blasi and Wasserman define pathological periods of our constitutional 
government as periods marked by a “sense of urgency stemming from societal disorientation 
if not panic.” Blasi, supra, at 468. Their defining characteristic is “a shift in basic attitudes, 
among certain influential actors if not the public at large,” about central constitutional tenets. 
Id. at 467. This panic “affects structural features and arrangements, such as formal and 
informal separation of powers and checks and balances, which may exert much less of a 
restraining influence on the political branches and the public.” Wasserman, supra, at 215 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 207.  
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, 
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, 
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves 
and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States 
of America. 
U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 208. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME 
OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY 4, 31 (2006) (arguing that “[t]he core meaning of ‘civil liberties’ 
is freedom from coercive or otherwise intrusive governmental actions designed to secure the 
nation against real or, sometimes, imagined internal and external enemies,” but courts must 
engage in a pragmatic cost-benefit analysis to determine the proper balance between the 
interests in liberty against those of national security); Ricardo J. Bascuas, Fourth Amendment 
Lessons from the Highway and the Subway: A Principled Approach to Suspicionless 
Searches, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 719, 722 (2007) (arguing that the case for suspicionless New 
York City subway searches is “relatively easy to make,” where the “threat of terrorism 
promises to proliferate suspicionless searches”); Ronald M. Gould & Simon Stern, 
Catastrophic Threats and the Fourth Amendment, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 777–78 (2004) 
(arguing that “traditional Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure doctrine was fine for an age 
of flintlocks” but that “large-scale searches undertaken to prevent horrific potential harms 
may be constitutionally sound”); Richard C. Worf, The Case for Rational Basis Review of 
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purpose of government, but it is not its sole purpose, and to elevate antiterrorism to 
a status that overshadows other values risks the corrosion of our constitutional 
foundations through a number of possible causes.209 
Furthermore, similar to the concept of privacy, we often have a difficult time 
defining exactly what “security” means, despite the fact that the rationale for the 
privacy-security balance appears to be a given in such discussions.210 Some 
commentators have suggested that governments, including the United States, 
leverage and politicize these ontological ambiguities to promote specific 
foreign-policy objectives, for example, declaring war on terrorism without a 
particular definition of what that means in real terms.211 For primarily this reason, 
commentators have called into question the presumed existence of a measurable 
privacy-security balance.212 
                                                                                                                 
General Suspicionless Searches and Seizures, 23 TOURO L. REV. 93, 131–37 (2007) (stating 
that suspicionless searches should be seen as reasonable, and therefore constitutional, if they 
have been approved by the legislature). 
 209. Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule categorize the various security policies 
implemented after September 11, 2011, which include military action, the detention of 
enemy combatants outside the theater of hostilities, heightened search and surveillance 
powers, ethnicity-based search and surveillance, coercive interrogation, immigration sweeps 
and surveillance, enactment of terrorism and material-support statutes, military trials, and 
censorship. ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, 
LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 7–9 (2007). 
 210. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 545 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring in 
part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment) (“For reasons of inescapable human 
nature, the branch of the Government asked to counter a serious threat is not the branch on 
which to rest the Nation’s entire reliance in striking the balance between the will to win and 
the cost in liberty on the way to victory; the responsibility for security will naturally amplify 
the claim that security legitimately raises.”); United States v. Warsame, 547 F. Supp. 2d 982, 
992 n.10 (D. Minn. 2008) (“[C]ourts upholding the constitutionality of [the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act] have done so not because a FISA order is a ‘warrant,’ but 
because . . . FISA strikes a reasonable balance between governmental interests in national 
security and individual liberty interests.”); Doe v. Gonzales, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379, 408−09 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“‘[T]he high stakes here pressing the scales . . . compel the Court to strike 
the most sensitive judicial balance, calibrating by delicate increments toward a result that 
adequately protects national security without unduly sacrificing individual freedoms.’” 
(quoting Doe v. Ashcroft, 33 F. Supp. 2d 471, 478 (2004))), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub 
nom. John Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2008); DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, 
LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY AMERICA IS LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR 101 (2007) (“[T]here 
are deep-rooted reasons why government officials are unlikely to balance security and the 
rule of law fairly or accurately in times of crisis . . . .”). 
 211. See, e.g., Alexander J. Marcopoulos, Terrorizing Rhetoric: The Advancement of 
U.S. Hegemony Through the Lack of a Definition of ‘Terror’ 2–3 (Jan. 13, 2009) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=1327155 (arguing that the United States has used ambiguous definitions of security and 
terrorism to its political advantage). 
 212. See, e.g., David Cole, No Reason To Believe: Radical Skepticism, Emergency 
Power, and Constitutional Constraint, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1329, 1334 (2008) (stating that the 
argument “that there is a necessary and straightforward tradeoff between liberty and security 
is far too simplistic” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Stephen Holmes, 
In Case of Emergency: Misunderstanding Tradeoffs in the War on Terror, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 
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III. PERSISTENT SURVEILLANCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL WARINESS OF STATE POWER 
The origins of the Fourth Amendment can be traced to early Americans’ 
antipathy toward general warrants, which gave British agents authority to conduct 
indiscriminate, suspicionless searches of people and their homes.213 While these 
general warrants led, of course, to privacy problems, the true underlying issue in 
this context was the individual’s relationship to the State and the need to keep a 
check on the balance of power in that relationship. Scholars and commentators 
have called for greater reinforcement of this constitutional principle, urging courts 
to think of the Fourth Amendment as “security from unreasonable governmental 
intrusion,” which follows directly from the Framers’ distaste for the “arbitrary 
exercise of [British government] power to invade their property.”214 
The shift of Fourth Amendment doctrine’s focus to one of privacy limits the 
amendment’s ability to protect citizens from arbitrary government power. Justice 
Jackson observed that the Fourth Amendment was meant to protect more than 
privacy alone; it was meant to ensure that government intrusions of individual 
privacy are based on rules established and overseen by the citizens.215 The current 
use of a Fourth Amendment balancing test between government need and 
individual privacy has taken this oversight away from individuals and instead 
established it in courts and law enforcement. 
The ease with which government agencies can now conduct persistent, 
collective surveillance on every citizen heightens the need to reorient Fourth 
Amendment doctrine back to its roots in the constitutional principle: to protect 
individuals from overwhelming government power. Some scholars have 
characterized this reorientation as a need for a balance of power.216 This approach 
often places too much emphasis on courts’ abilities to effectively judge (and 
attenuate) a swinging pendulum of Fourth Amendment doctrine and bears too much 
                                                                                                                 
301, 313 (2009) (observing that “the master metaphor dominating discussions of the war on 
terror is the idea of a necessary tradeoff between liberty and security” but that the “metaphor 
is loaded” because “it is seductively easy to illustrate”); Jeremy Waldron, Safety and 
Security, 85 NEB. L. REV. 454, 456 (2006) (“Although we know that ‘security’ is a vague and 
ambiguous concept, and though we should suspect that its vagueness is a source of danger 
when talk of trade-offs is in the air, still there has been little or no attempt in the literature of 
legal and political theory to bring any sort of clarity to the concept.” (footnote omitted)). 
 213. The Founders’ concerns about unabated government power are shown in three 
seminal search-and-seizure cases that predate the Constitution: Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 95 
Eng. Rep. 766 (K.B.); 2 Vent. 69; Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.); 19 
How. St. Tri. 1030; and the Writs of Assistance Case, see M.H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF 
ASSISTANCE CASE (1978); see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 463 (1928) 
(observing that the “well known historical purpose of the Fourth Amendment” was “directed 
against general warrants and writs of assistance”), overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347 (1967); Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 
MICH. L. REV. 547, 558 (1999). 
 214. Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy, 
or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 351−52 (1998). 
 215. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 216. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 139 (arguing that constantly changing technologies and 
social practices require the Supreme Court to adjust Fourth Amendment protections to 
achieve a power equilibrium between citizens and government). 
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uncomfortable resemblance to the current balancing-test jurisprudence. I 
recommend, rather, that courts evaluate Fourth Amendment problems posed by 
mass-surveillance programs by recognizing their true social cost and assessing the 
fundamental constitutional tenet that protects the individual citizen from the 
overwhelming power of the State.217 
A. The Cost of Persistent, Collective Surveillance 
As illustrated in Part II.D, supra, a protocol calling for the suspicionless, 
systematic, and physical search of every citizen would not long survive, largely due 
to the impossibility of such a protocol’s practical application and the resentment it 
would generate among citizens. But what happens when technological advances 
allow government to collect and store the electronic data we generate, completely 
unbeknownst to the person being searched? The government can avoid the twin 
checks of limited police resources and community hostility that ordinarily constrain 
abusive law-enforcement practices. This new model of surveillance threatens a 
value just as fundamental to Fourth Amendment analysis as privacy—the mutual 
trust between government and the governed necessary in any democratic society.218 
In a 1974 law review article, former Chief Justice William Rehnquist posed the 
following hypothetical to illustrate the tension between the normative concept of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 217. The Founders were quite clear on the need for this constitutional principle. For 
example, James Madison had expressed this view in a letter to Thomas Jefferson on the 
subject of a possible Bill of Rights: 
In our Governments the real power lies in the majority of the Community, and 
the invasion of private rights is cheifly [sic] to be apprehended, not from acts of 
Government contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the 
Government is the mere instrument of the major number of the constituents. . . . 
[But] there may be occasions on which the evil may spring from [government 
self-interest]; and on such, a bill of rights will be a good ground for an appeal to 
the sense of the community. 
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON 295, 298−99 (Robert A. Rutland & Charles F. Hobson eds., 1977). 
 218. The inherent threat to constitutional values from persistent, collective surveillance 
was acknowledged by Justice Sotomayor in United States. v. Jones: 
In cases involving even short-term monitoring, some unique attributes of GPS 
surveillance relevant to the Katz analysis will require particular attention. GPS 
monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public 
movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, 
professional, religious, and sexual associations. The Government can store such 
records and efficiently mine them for information years into the future. [United 
States v.] Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2010) (opinion of 
Kozinski, C.J.). And because GPS monitoring is cheap in comparison to 
conventional surveillance techniques and, by design, proceeds surreptitiously, it 
evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law enforcement practices: 
“limited police resources and community hostility.” 
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955−56 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citations 
omitted). While Justice Sotomayor was addressing the specific issue of surreptitious GPS 
tracking, the principles she articulates apply to all such “invisible” techniques of government 
surveillance. 
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privacy and privacy as interpreted by the Fourth Amendment.219 In the 
hypothetical, the reader is asked to imagine that a police officer is required to stand 
in the parking lot of a bar from the hours of 5:30 p.m. to 7:30 p.m. every day.220 
During this time, the police officer records the license plate of every car that parks 
in the bar’s parking lot in order to make a list of the bar’s regular customers.221 For 
the purposes of the hypothetical, Rehnquist asked the reader to assume that the 
police officer has no reason to know of any unlawful conduct at the bar or by the 
bar’s customers.222 
As Rehnquist points out in his article, this type of persistent surveillance, with 
no knowledge of any unlawful conduct or other special circumstances, would strike 
most Americans as an improper police function, with a substantial segment reacting 
with an “affirmative dislike” of this unwarranted surveillance.223 But these same 
people would likely agree that driving a car down a public street to an open parking 
lot adjacent to a bar that is open to the public is not a private act in a normative 
sense of the term. In fact, any private citizen, newspaper reporter, or survey taker 
would have the right to do exactly what the police officer in the hypothetical was 
doing. The difference, as many would see it, is that this sort of baseless, persistent 
surveillance is not a proper government function.224 Chief Justice Rehnquist 
attributed this common reaction to his hypothetical’s “extreme” set of facts.225 
But what may have been considered an extreme—and unworkable—program 
of persistent surveillance in 1974 is no longer just material for boundary-seeking 
law school hypotheticals. Rather, breathtaking advances in technology have 
become so commonplace that they have been blended into our everyday lives and 
have been allowed to take up residence among some of our most private of 
activities, while these same technologies make possible the persistent, 
collective-surveillance programs conducted by the NSA. These warrantless 
surveillance programs have a toxic effect on fundamental constitutional 
principles and values that go beyond mere privacy and are therefore prohibited by 
“the traditional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures afforded 
by the common law at the time of the framing.”226 
                                                                                                                 
 
 219. William H. Rehnquist, Is an Expanded Right of Privacy Consistent with Fair and 
Effective Law Enforcement? Or: Privacy, You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby, 23 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 1, 9 (1974). 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995). In Wilson, Justice Thomas explained 
that although “reasonableness” is a key consideration in the modern Court’s Fourth 
Amendment analysis, the reasonableness of a challenged search or seizure “may be guided 
by the meaning ascribed to it by the Framers of the Amendment.” Id. 
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B. Checks on Arbitrariness of State Power 
The Constitution was written to provide citizens with substantive protections 
against arbitrary and oppressive government actions227 and, as such, is based 
squarely upon the principle of limited grants of power to governments.228 Inherent 
in these protections is the legitimate constitutional need to control the discretion of 
government agents in order to prevent arbitrary surveillance without any Fourth 
Amendment oversight or restraint; however, technological advancements and the 
near-ubiquity of networked computing and communications have hampered our 
usual means of oversight.229 
Following Katz, the Supreme Court has approached this problem by considering 
certain factors in order to determine whether the government’s use of a new 
technology fits into the categories of searches precluded by the Founders.230 But 
this approach is a formalistic adherence to Katz, at best. What is missing from this 
analysis is an examination of the constitutional values at stake beyond mere 
physical privacy.231 Rather than maintaining focus on government needs or 
                                                                                                                 
 
 227. One can look to the doctrine of substantive due process for ample evidence of the 
Court’s long recognition of this constitutional principle, which is seen as a “bulwark[] . . . 
against arbitrary” government action. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 532–36 (1884) 
(concluding that “arbitrary exertions of power,” even those that are “legislative in form,” 
violate due process); see also Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 244 
(1819) (“As to the words from Magna Charta, incorporated into the constitution of 
Maryland, after volumes spoken and written with a view to their exposition, the good sense 
of mankind has at length settled down to this: that they were intended to secure the 
individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government, unrestrained by the 
established principles of private rights and distributive justice.”). 
 228.  
We may rely on the conditions which existed when the Constitution was 
adopted . . . . [T]hat government by the people instituted by the Constitution 
would not imitate the conduct of arbitrary monarchs. The abuse of power 
might, indeed, be apprehended, but not that it would be manifested in 
provisions or practices which would shock the sensibilities of men. 
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 375 (1910). 
 229. This is not a new problem, of course. Congress recognized this issue over two 
decades ago. See ROBERT W. KASTENMEIER, H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ELECTRONIC 
COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT OF 1986, H.R. REP. NO. 99-647 (1986). 
When the Framers of the Constitution acted to guard against the arbitrary use of 
government power to maintain surveillance over citizens, there were limited 
methods of intrusion into the “houses, papers and effects” protected by the 
Fourth Amendment. During the intervening 200 years, development of new 
methods of communication and devices for surveillance has expanded 
dramatically the opportunity for such intrusions. 
Id. at 16. 
 230. See Christopher Slobogin, Technologically-Assisted Physical Surveillance: The 
American Bar Association’s Tentative Draft Standards, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 383, 
398−404 (1997) (summarizing factors used in case law). 
 231. As Professor Amsterdam has observed, 
The ultimate question, plainly, is a value judgment. It is whether, if the 
particular form of surveillance practiced by the police is permitted to go 
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bemoaning a loss of government efficiency, courts should reorient their point of 
view to reestablish the Fourth Amendment as a citizens’ tool to regulate 
government power.232 The focus, therefore, should be shifted away from the 
reasonable expectation of privacy balancing test, since “[i]n many instances, what is 
or isn’t protected by the Fourth Amendment bears no relation to the problems caused 
by government information gathering.” Instead, consideration should be paid to 
“whether it is best to have judicial oversight of law-enforcement activity, what that 
oversight should consist of, how much limitation we want to impose on various 
government activities, and how we should guard against abuses of power.”233 
Professor Kerr’s equilibrium adjustment theory234 and Professor Ohm’s 
improvements upon that theory235 seek to provide practical advice to judges on a 
shift in Fourth Amendment doctrine from privacy to power. Ohm argues that the 
relationship between private and public surveillance, where commercial 
technologies such as cell phones and social networks are gradually becoming 
omniscient, is turning the current privacy-oriented doctrine from a “slow and 
partial degradation of the Fourth Amendment” into a “full evisceration.”236 Both 
approaches suggest that courts reorient their Fourth Amendment balancing test to 
one that (somehow) measures the balance of power between government and 
citizen. To apply this measurement, Ohm suggests a metric that strives to maintain 
a “fixed ratio between [government] efficiency and individual liberty,” which 
courts adjust as our technology continues to improve, thus enforcing a constant—
and relatively increasing—level of government inefficiency.237 
Regardless of the approach, any move from privacy to power as a core fixture of 
Fourth Amendment doctrine will not come without some amount of disruption. 
This new paradigm would shift the costs back to the government, and the 
perspective back to the individual, and would force the reevaluation of post-Katz 
jurisprudence. If the constitutional norm that seeks to protect citizens from 
government power through unwarranted intrusions once again becomes the focus 
of the Court’s Fourth Amendment doctrine, our freedom from arbitrary 
governmental action will receive the proper attention from the “federal institutional 
processes established to protect that freedom.”238 
                                                                                                                 
unregulated by constitutional restraints, the amount of privacy and freedom 
remaining to citizens would be diminished to a compass inconsistent with the 
aims of a free and open society. 
Amsterdam, supra note 136, at 403. 
 232. As noted by Justice Brandeis, our constitutional system of checks and balances “was 
adopted by the [Framers], not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary 
power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction 
incident to the distribution of the governmental powers . . . to save the people from 
autocracy.” Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 233. SOLOVE, supra note 15, at 115. 
 234. See Kerr, supra note 139. 
 235. Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 MISS. L.J. 
1309 (2012). 
 236. Id. at 1311. 
 237. Id. at 1346. 
 238. Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 
67, 88 (1960). 
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IV. COLLECTIVE SUSPICION’S CORROSIVE EFFECT ON MUTUAL SOCIETAL TRUST 
A. The Importance of Social Trust in a Constitutional Democracy 
The Founders’ conception of the Constitution was of a “constitution of 
principle,” securing basic liberties and protecting core values, as opposed to a mere 
“constitution of detail,” which simply enumerates a discrete list of rights.239 
Further, scholars such as the philosopher John Rawls have interpreted the 
Constitution as an agreement specifying certain liberties in terms of our capacity 
for a sense of justice and our capacity for a conception of the overall good.240 Thus, 
our Constitution is meant to embody the values we see as necessary for social 
cooperation and governance, which must be based on mutual respect and trust.241 
Societies without trust tend toward the Hobbesian end of the spectrum and lack 
the sort of peaceful, stable, and productive communities the Framers intended.242 
                                                                                                                 
 
 239. RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, 
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 119 (1993) (emphasis omitted) (coining and 
contrasting a “constitution of principle”—a coherent set of abstract, normative principles and 
values—with a “constitution of detail”—a particularized list of rules); see also Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (“Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process 
Clauses of the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of 
liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific. They did not 
presume to have this insight. They knew times can blind us to certain truths and later 
generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to 
oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in 
their own search for greater freedom.”). 
 240. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 36–37 (1996). Rawls’s theory of justice as 
fairness translates to a constitutional conception of a fair system of social cooperation. Rawls 
asserts that citizens of a constitutional democracy apply their capacity for a sense of justice 
when evaluating the justice of social institutions and policies. Similarly, Rawls states that 
this sense is coupled with our pursuit of a conception of the good, or what is valuable in 
human life. See id. at 15–20, 29–35, 302, 332. 
 241. The absence of mutual trust can poison even the simplest of social or commercial 
interactions. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, in ALTRUISM, MORALITY, 
AND ECONOMIC THEORY 13, 15 (Edmund S. Phelps ed., 1975) (citing the foundational 
importance of trust in commercial transactions); Partha Dasgupta, Trust as a Commodity, in 
TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 49, 64 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988) 
(defining trust as a public good); Carol M. Rose, Giving, Trading, Thieving, and Trusting: 
How and Why Gifts Become Exchanges, and (More Importantly) Vice Versa, 44 FLA. L. REV. 
295, 311–313 (1992) (examining how trust is essential to social exchange). 
 242. Political theorists strenuously emphasized the importance of societal trust at the time 
of the Framing. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 124 (Thomas 
P. Peardon ed., The Liberal Arts Press, Inc. 1952) (1690) (“Whensoever, therefore, the 
legislative shall transgress this fundamental rule of society, and either by ambition, fear, folly, 
or corruption, endeavor to grasp themselves, or put into the hands of any other, an absolute 
power over the lives, liberties, and estates of the people; by this breach of trust they forfeit the 
power the people had put into their hands for quite contrary ends, and it devolves to the people, 
who have a right to resume their original liberty, and, by the establishment of a new legislative, 
such as they shall think fit, provide for their own safety and security, which is the end for which 
they are in society.”); see also 1 JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY ch. 
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Societal trust, in this sense, can be defined as “the actor’s belief that, at worst, 
others will not knowingly or willingly do him harm, and at best, that they will act 
in his interests.”243 The essence of this theme has been distilled into the description 
“encapsulated interest.”244 Just as people can build reputations of trustworthiness, 
so can governments. And just as personal betrayals can destroy individual 
relationships, a society’s health is “dependent . . . on the justice of their 
community’s political decisions.”245 History provides ample empirical evidence of 
the widespread problems that arise in societies with low levels of trust.246 
B. The Costs Associated with a Collapse of Trust: Trust as a Constitutional Value 
The once-revolutionary concept of mutual trust between government and citizen 
is firmly embedded as a fundamental value underlying this nation’s society. Justice 
Brandeis articulated the basis of the Fourth Amendment as that of the “right to be 
let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized 
men.”247 This core principle has been a basis of our constitutional system of 
government since its inception.248 Since our government is granted legitimacy only 
                                                                                                                 
vii, § 5, at 110 (J.M. Robson ed., Univ. of Toronto Press 1965) (1848) (“Conjoint action is 
possible just in proportion as human beings can rely on each other. There are countries in 
Europe, of first-rate industrial capabilities, where the most serious impediment to conducting 
business concerns on a large scale, is the rarity of persons who are supposed fit to be trusted 
with the receipt and expenditure of large sums of money.”); GEORG SIMMEL, THE SOCIOLOGY 
OF GEORG SIMMEL 318 (Kurt H. Wolff ed. & trans., The Free Press 1950) (trust “is one of the 
most important synthetic forces within society”). 
 243. Kenneth Newton, Trust, Social Capital, Civil Society, and Democracy, 22 INT’L 
POL. SCI. REV. 201, 202 (2001). The concept of trust can be somewhat slippery to define, and 
largely depends on context. David Good has offered a functional definition of trust, where 
“trust is based on an individual’s theory as to how another person will perform on some 
future occasion.” David Good, Individuals, Interpersonal Relations, and Trust, in TRUST: 
MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS, supra note 241, at 31, 33 (footnote 
omitted). Another helpful description belies our need to rely on one another in society: “trust is 
a device for coping with the freedom of other persons.” John Dunn, Trust and Political Agency, 
in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS, supra note 241, at 73, 80. 
 244. RUSSELL HARDIN, TRUST AND TRUSTWORTHINESS 25–27 (2002). 
 245. Ronald Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 479, 502 (1989). 
 246. Levels of trust shown in social surveys are good indicators of the overall 
trustworthiness of the societies in which the survey respondents live, telling us more about 
the societies and their structures than about the individual personality types. See ROBERT D. 
PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 138 
(2000). Further studies have shown that wealthier nations, and those with greater income 
equality, have higher levels of trust than poorer and more unequal ones. See Ronald 
Inglehart, Trust, Well-Being and Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND TRUST 88 (Mark E. 
Warren ed., 1999). As one scholar puts it, “Social life without trust would be intolerable and, 
most likely, quite impossible.” Newton, supra note 243, at 202. 
 247. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), 
overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 248. As Justice Brandeis so eloquently put it: 
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the 
pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man’s spiritual 
nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the 
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through the trust citizens confer via regular elections, this principle is interwoven 
into the very nature of our institutions. 
The Fourth Amendment is a direct result of the Founders’ constitutional value of 
reciprocal trust. Specifically, this amendment requires that government trust its 
citizens to act responsibly, a principle that is violated when government is allowed 
to step into citizens’ lives without first finding that a citizen has given up that trust 
by failing to act responsibly.249 This governing constitutional principle is made 
even plainer in comparison to totalitarian governments, which maintain power and 
exercise control by sending a strong message to their citizens that the State is 
superior to the individual, doing so through monitored communications, random 
searches, and the use of citizen-informants.250 Where totalitarian governments tend 
to maintain stability only through force and control, the long-term stability of our 
constitutional form of government is due in large part to the value of reciprocal 
trust between the State and its citizens, which grants those citizens the right and 
ability to participate in this society in a meaningful way.251 
While it is unlikely that government’s use of collective surveillance will produce 
the sort of widespread unrest and violence that has resulted from racial alienation 
                                                                                                                 
pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They 
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and 
their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let 
alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized 
men. 
Id. 
 249. This trust by government of its citizens was a crucial innovation in liberal 
democracy: 
Liberal, pluralist democracy is primarily procedural. Its consensus about 
procedure . . . is the foundation for mutual trust at least in the political arena. 
Although this consensus does not have to be universal, it does have to be 
widespread. 
. . . . 
. . . [M]utal trust, . . . politically defined, is the confidence in or reliance on 
others who are also committed to a way of conducting and resolving disputes 
about values; it is the expectation that they will generally comply with the 
outcomes even when they do not endorse them. 
JAMES F. CHILDRESS, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND TRUST 7 (1975) (emphases omitted). 
 250. Maria Los provides excellent examples and analysis of manifestations in former 
Communist nations and how these legacies affect their current governments in the digital age. 
Maria Los, A Trans-Systemic Surveillance: The Legacy of Communist Surveillance in the 
Digital Age, in SURVEILLANCE AND DEMOCRACY 173 (Kevin D. Haggerty & Minas Samatas 
eds., 2010) (describing the surveillance methods left behind in formerly Communist states and 
applied to new technologies since 9/11, along with their corrosive effects on those societies). 
 251. For examples of what can happen when this reciprocal trust breaks down and 
individuals feel powerless to meaningfully affect the system, we can look to the rioting and 
unrest that has taken place when the government has shown contempt for certain subgroups 
of the population through biased legislation or unjust law enforcement. See, e.g., DENNIS E. 
GALE, UNDERSTANDING URBAN UNREST: FROM REVEREND KING TO RODNEY KING (1996) 
(examining government response to unrest and violence over alienation and lack of 
participation); Sheldon G. Levy, Dimensions of Attitudes Toward Race Relations and 
Polarized Subgroups in Detroit Following the 1967 Riot, 6 PROC. ANN. CONVENTION AM. 
PSYCHOL. ASS’N. 307 (1971) (analyzing alienation and race relations as causes of rioting). 
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and societal powerlessness, milder results such as increased individual cynicism 
leading to decreased participation or outright mistrust of government agencies and 
agents can be just as destructive to our democratic society, with the possible 
devolution of our government into the sort of aristocratic enterprise the Founders 
wanted to avoid.252 Further, it is not clear that that these corrosive government 
practices have any real benefit that might provide some argument in support of 
their use.253 The continued misrepresentation of these programs only serves to 
enhance the levels of mistrust citizens have for their government.254 A widespread 
failure of trust of government by its citizens can only serve to harm the complex 
balance our society has put in place. 
CONCLUSION 
The Framers of the Constitution were quite clear in their intent to protect 
citizens from unwarranted intrusions by their government, and this principle was 
embedded into our constitutional form of government through the language of the 
Fourth Amendment. While it is expected that government should provide for our 
common defense, a democratic society such as ours cannot long tolerate secret 
government surveillance programs that collect, store, and analyze our private 
communications and papers, with no individualized suspicion of wrongdoing and 
no basis in law. The needs of national security should not blind us to the legal and 
societal costs of collective surveillance, nor should we be willing to sacrifice our 
constitutional values in a quixotic pursuit of perfect security. 
This is not a question of whether government needs to conduct directed 
surveillance in its defense capacity—of course it does. But it should do so without 
violating the reciprocal trust of citizens and without stepping over the constitutional 
protections from unwarranted governmental intrusions.255 Justice Robert Jackson 
                                                                                                                 
 
 252. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 
1140 (1991). 
 253. In a hearing held before the Senate Judiciary Committee, NSA Director Keith 
Alexander admitted that only thirteen of the fifty-four instances the NSA cited as terrorism 
plots foiled through collective surveillance had any connection to the United States. Further, 
Director of National Intelligence James Clapper claimed that, even though there were few 
examples of any real benefits to the NSA’s persistent, collective-surveillance programs, the real 
measure that should be applied to judge the success of these programs is the “peace of mind 
metric.” Yochai Benkler, Fact: The NSA Gets Negligible Intel from Americans’ Metadata. So 
End Collection, GUARDIAN (Oct. 8, 2013, 12:02 PM), http://www.theguardian.com
/commentisfree/2013/oct/08/nsa-bulk-metadata-surveillance-intelligence. 
 254. See CHILDRESS, supra note 249, at 7 (“[M]utual trust . . . politically defined, is the 
confidence in or reliance on others who are also committed to a way of conducting and 
resolving disputes about values; it is the expectation that they will generally comply with the 
outcomes even when they do not endorse them.”). 
 255. It is worth noting that there has been a cooling of support within some corners of 
government for the broad surveillance programs initiated in the weeks and months following 
the attacks of September 11, 2001. See, e.g., Siobhan Gorman, Leahy Bill Seen as Best 
Chance for a Revamp to Surveillance, WALL ST. J., July 30, 2014, at A5. This shift in 
thinking appears to be part of an overall reexamination of post-9/11 government policies. It 
is too soon to tell, however, exactly what effect these efforts might have on Fourth 
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warned that this tension between security and liberty should not lead us to a 
constitutional “suicide pact” by ignoring common sense and seeking purity of 
doctrine.256 But at what point does an imminent danger overwhelm our 
constitutional right to liberty? This nation and its Constitution have survived even 
greater existential threats than those we face today. It is not as clear that our society 
would be able to survive the corrosive effects of collective surveillance. The 
atrophy of civil liberties would be a “suicide pact” of a different kind, where the 
loss of our constitutional principles of protection from undue government power 
and of mutual trust between government and citizen makes our current models of 
society and government unsustainable.257 
Contrary to what some within the intelligence community might believe or wish 
to be true, our society has never operated under the supposition that government 
agents are entitled to every fact about every individual.258 Technological 
advancements have eliminated some of the natural physical boundaries that 
prevented collective, persistent surveillance programs such as the suspicionless 
decryption program revealed in the Snowden documents—our system of laws must 
adjust to fill these gaps. As these physical hurdles continue to fall, default Fourth 
Amendment doctrine should likewise continue to deny government intrusions 
without individualized, articulable suspicion. To do otherwise is to relinquish our 
                                                                                                                 
Amendment doctrine, especially when it comes to questions—real or perceived—of national 
security. 
 256.  
This Court has gone far toward accepting the doctrine that civil liberty means 
. . . that all local attempts to maintain order are impairments of the liberty of the 
citizen. The choice is not between order and liberty. It is between liberty with 
order and anarchy without either. There is a danger that, if the Court does not 
temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert the 
constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact. 
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 257. It is notable that Justice Jackson, despite his warnings of a Fourth Amendment 
“suicide pact,” also made clear his awareness of the dangers inherent in failing to protect 
citizens’ civil liberties: 
[Rights under the Fourth Amendment], I protest, are not mere second-class 
rights but belong in the catalog of indispensable freedoms. Among deprivations 
of rights, none is so effective in cowing a population, crushing the spirit of the 
individual and putting terror in every heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is 
one of the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary 
government. And one need only briefly to have dwelt and worked among a 
people possessed of many admirable qualities but deprived of these rights to 
know that the human personality deteriorates and dignity and self-reliance 
disappear where homes, persons and possessions are subject at any hour to 
unheralded search and seizure by the police.  
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180–81 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 258. Documents leaked by Mr. Snowden have revealed government agencies and 
programs “intent on maintaining [their] dominance in intelligence collection,” with plans to 
“expand [their] surveillance powers,” without any apparent internal boundaries. James Risen 
& Laura Poitras, N.S.A. Report Outlined Goals for More Power, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2013, 
at A1; see also Scott Shane, No Morsel Too Minuscule for All-Consuming N.S.A., N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 3, 2013, at A1. 
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constitutional checks on government power and destroy the mutual trust necessary 
for our society to function. 
Rethinking Fourth Amendment doctrine is not, of course, an easy or 
straightforward task. My suggested course at this point, however, is a return to the 
Brandeisian examination of the “privacies of life,” which suffer when warrantless, 
unparticularized government surveillance becomes “the invasion of his indefeasible 
right of personal security, personal liberty and private property.”259 Work must be 
done to recenter Fourth Amendment thought around fundamental constitutional 
values and avoid the fact-specific hair-splitting that the reasonable expectation of 
privacy test has yielded. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 259. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474–75 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), 
overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
